From: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@xxxxxxxxx>
[ Upstream commit 5fe23f262e0548ca7f19fb79f89059a60d087d22 ]
There is a race condition between ucma_close() and ucma_resolve_ip():
CPU0 CPU1
ucma_resolve_ip(): ucma_close():
ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id);
list_for_each_entry_safe(ctx, tmp, &file->ctx_list, list) {
mutex_lock(&mut);
idr_remove(&ctx_idr, ctx->id);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
...
mutex_lock(&mut);
if (!ctx->closing) {
mutex_unlock(&mut);
rdma_destroy_id(ctx->cm_id);
...
ucma_free_ctx(ctx);
ret = rdma_resolve_addr();
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
Before idr_remove(), ucma_get_ctx() could still find the ctx
and after rdma_destroy_id(), rdma_resolve_addr() may still
access id_priv pointer. Also, ucma_put_ctx() may use ctx after
ucma_free_ctx() too.
ucma_close() should call ucma_put_ctx() too which tests the
refcnt and waits for the last one releasing it. The similar
pattern is already used by ucma_destroy_id().
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+da2591e115d57a9cbb8b@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Reported-by: syzbot+cfe3c1e8ef634ba8964b@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@xxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c
index a22b992cde38..c1a7ed6306bd 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c
@@ -1736,6 +1736,8 @@ static int ucma_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
mutex_lock(&mut);
if (!ctx->closing) {
mutex_unlock(&mut);
+ ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
+ wait_for_completion(&ctx->comp);
/* rdma_destroy_id ensures that no event handlers are
* inflight for that id before releasing it.
*/
--
2.17.1
