On Mon, Aug 27, 2018 at 4:12 PM, Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Tue, Aug 28, 2018 at 1:04 AM Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> In NMI context, we might be in the middle of context switching or in >> the middle of switch_mm_irqs_off(). In either case, CR3 might not >> match current->mm, which could cause copy_from_user_nmi() and >> friends to read the wrong memory. >> >> Fix it by adding a new nmi_uaccess_okay() helper and checking it in >> copy_from_user_nmi() and in __copy_from_user_nmi()'s callers. > > What about eBPF probes (which I think can be attached to kprobe points > / tracepoints / perf events) that perform userspace reads / userspace > writes / kernel reads? Can those run in NMI context, and if so, do > they also need special handling? I assume they can run in NMI context, which might be problematic in and of themselves. For example, does BPF adequately protect against a BPF program accessing a map while bpf(2) is modifying it? It seems like bpf_prog_active is intended to serve this purpose. But I don't see any obvious mechanism for eBPF programs to read user memory.