4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yonghong Song <yhs@xxxxxx>
commit 3a38bb98d9abdc3856f26b5ed4332803065cd7cf upstream.
syzbot reported a possible deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog.
The error details:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor7/24531 is trying to acquire lock:
(bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000008a849b07>] perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854
but task is already holding lock:
(&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<0000000038768f87>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x198/0x280 mm/util.c:353
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}:
__might_fault+0x13a/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4571
_copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline]
bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0xf2/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1694
perf_event_query_prog_array+0x1c7/0x2c0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:891
_perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4750 [inline]
perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4770
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686
SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline]
SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692
do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
-> #0 (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}:
lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893
mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908
perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854
perf_event_free_bpf_prog kernel/events/core.c:8147 [inline]
_free_event+0xbdb/0x10f0 kernel/events/core.c:4116
put_event+0x24/0x30 kernel/events/core.c:4204
perf_mmap_close+0x60d/0x1010 kernel/events/core.c:5172
remove_vma+0xb4/0x1b0 mm/mmap.c:172
remove_vma_list mm/mmap.c:2490 [inline]
do_munmap+0x82a/0xdf0 mm/mmap.c:2731
mmap_region+0x59e/0x15a0 mm/mmap.c:1646
do_mmap+0x6c0/0xe00 mm/mmap.c:1483
do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2223 [inline]
vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1de/0x280 mm/util.c:355
SYSC_mmap_pgoff mm/mmap.c:1533 [inline]
SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x462/0x5f0 mm/mmap.c:1491
SYSC_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline]
SyS_mmap+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91
do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
lock(bpf_event_mutex);
lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
lock(bpf_event_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
======================================================
The bug is introduced by Commit f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow
user space to query prog array on the same tp") where copy_to_user,
which requires mm->mmap_sem, is called inside bpf_event_mutex lock.
At the same time, during perf_event file descriptor close,
mm->mmap_sem is held first and then subsequent
perf_event_detach_bpf_prog needs bpf_event_mutex lock.
Such a senario caused a deadlock.
As suggested by Daniel, moving copy_to_user out of the
bpf_event_mutex lock should fix the problem.
Fixes: f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp")
Reported-by: syzbot+dc5ca0e4c9bfafaf2bae@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@xxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 4 ++--
kernel/bpf/core.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++----
3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -335,8 +335,8 @@ int bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(struct b
void bpf_prog_array_delete_safe(struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs,
struct bpf_prog *old_prog);
int bpf_prog_array_copy_info(struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *array,
- __u32 __user *prog_ids, u32 request_cnt,
- __u32 __user *prog_cnt);
+ u32 *prog_ids, u32 request_cnt,
+ u32 *prog_cnt);
int bpf_prog_array_copy(struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *old_array,
struct bpf_prog *exclude_prog,
struct bpf_prog *include_prog,
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -1572,13 +1572,32 @@ int bpf_prog_array_length(struct bpf_pro
return cnt;
}
+static bool bpf_prog_array_copy_core(struct bpf_prog **prog,
+ u32 *prog_ids,
+ u32 request_cnt)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+
+ for (; *prog; prog++) {
+ if (*prog == &dummy_bpf_prog.prog)
+ continue;
+ prog_ids[i] = (*prog)->aux->id;
+ if (++i == request_cnt) {
+ prog++;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return !!(*prog);
+}
+
int bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs,
__u32 __user *prog_ids, u32 cnt)
{
struct bpf_prog **prog;
unsigned long err = 0;
- u32 i = 0, *ids;
bool nospc;
+ u32 *ids;
/* users of this function are doing:
* cnt = bpf_prog_array_length();
@@ -1595,16 +1614,7 @@ int bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(struct b
return -ENOMEM;
rcu_read_lock();
prog = rcu_dereference(progs)->progs;
- for (; *prog; prog++) {
- if (*prog == &dummy_bpf_prog.prog)
- continue;
- ids[i] = (*prog)->aux->id;
- if (++i == cnt) {
- prog++;
- break;
- }
- }
- nospc = !!(*prog);
+ nospc = bpf_prog_array_copy_core(prog, ids, cnt);
rcu_read_unlock();
err = copy_to_user(prog_ids, ids, cnt * sizeof(u32));
kfree(ids);
@@ -1683,22 +1693,25 @@ int bpf_prog_array_copy(struct bpf_prog_
}
int bpf_prog_array_copy_info(struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *array,
- __u32 __user *prog_ids, u32 request_cnt,
- __u32 __user *prog_cnt)
+ u32 *prog_ids, u32 request_cnt,
+ u32 *prog_cnt)
{
+ struct bpf_prog **prog;
u32 cnt = 0;
if (array)
cnt = bpf_prog_array_length(array);
- if (copy_to_user(prog_cnt, &cnt, sizeof(cnt)))
- return -EFAULT;
+ *prog_cnt = cnt;
/* return early if user requested only program count or nothing to copy */
if (!request_cnt || !cnt)
return 0;
- return bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(array, prog_ids, request_cnt);
+ /* this function is called under trace/bpf_trace.c: bpf_event_mutex */
+ prog = rcu_dereference_check(array, 1)->progs;
+ return bpf_prog_array_copy_core(prog, prog_ids, request_cnt) ? -ENOSPC
+ : 0;
}
static void bpf_prog_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -876,6 +876,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct p
{
struct perf_event_query_bpf __user *uquery = info;
struct perf_event_query_bpf query = {};
+ u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len;
int ret;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
@@ -884,15 +885,31 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct p
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&query, uquery, sizeof(query)))
return -EFAULT;
- if (query.ids_len > BPF_TRACE_MAX_PROGS)
+
+ ids_len = query.ids_len;
+ if (ids_len > BPF_TRACE_MAX_PROGS)
return -E2BIG;
+ ids = kcalloc(ids_len, sizeof(u32), GFP_USER | __GFP_NOWARN);
+ if (!ids)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ /*
+ * The above kcalloc returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR when ids_len = 0, which
+ * is required when user only wants to check for uquery->prog_cnt.
+ * There is no need to check for it since the case is handled
+ * gracefully in bpf_prog_array_copy_info.
+ */
mutex_lock(&bpf_event_mutex);
ret = bpf_prog_array_copy_info(event->tp_event->prog_array,
- uquery->ids,
- query.ids_len,
- &uquery->prog_cnt);
+ ids,
+ ids_len,
+ &prog_cnt);
mutex_unlock(&bpf_event_mutex);
+ if (copy_to_user(&uquery->prog_cnt, &prog_cnt, sizeof(prog_cnt)) ||
+ copy_to_user(uquery->ids, ids, ids_len * sizeof(u32)))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+
+ kfree(ids);
return ret;
}
