4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@xxxxxxx>
commit 43838a23a05fbd13e47d750d3dfd77001536dd33 upstream.
The crng_init variable has three states:
0: The CRNG is not initialized at all
1: The CRNG has a small amount of entropy, hopefully good enough for
early-boot, non-cryptographical use cases
2: The CRNG is fully initialized and we are sure it is safe for
cryptographic use cases.
The crng_ready() function should only return true once we are in the
last state. This addresses CVE-2018-1108.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Fixes: e192be9d9a30 ("random: replace non-blocking pool...")
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxx # 4.8+
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@xxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ struct crng_state primary_crng = {
* its value (from 0->1->2).
*/
static int crng_init = 0;
-#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 0))
+#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)
static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp
if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
return 0;
- if (crng_ready()) {
+ if (crng_init != 0) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
return 0;
}
@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_st
{
unsigned long v, flags;
- if (crng_init > 1 &&
+ if (crng_ready() &&
time_after(jiffies, crng->init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ? &input_pool : NULL);
spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
@@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, i
fast_mix(fast_pool);
add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
- if (!crng_ready()) {
+ if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool,
sizeof(fast_pool->pool))) {
@@ -2148,7 +2148,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const ch
{
struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool;
- if (!crng_ready()) {
+ if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
crng_fast_load(buffer, count);
return;
}