[PATCH 4.9 16/66] arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit

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4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>


From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>

commit c2f0ad4fc089cff81cef6a13d04b399980ecbfcc upstream.

A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong
addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok
check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess
routines.

This patch prevents this forwarding from taking place, but putting heavy
barriers in set_fs after writing the addr_limit.

Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx> [v4.9 backport]
Tested-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -68,6 +68,13 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t f
 	current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs;
 
 	/*
+	 * Prevent a mispredicted conditional call to set_fs from forwarding
+	 * the wrong address limit to access_ok under speculation.
+	 */
+	dsb(nsh);
+	isb();
+
+	/*
 	 * Enable/disable UAO so that copy_to_user() etc can access
 	 * kernel memory with the unprivileged instructions.
 	 */





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