From: Ed Swierk <eswierk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[ Upstream commit 9382fe71c0058465e942a633869629929102843d ]
IPv4 and IPv6 packets may arrive with lower-layer padding that is not
included in the L3 length. For example, a short IPv4 packet may have
up to 6 bytes of padding following the IP payload when received on an
Ethernet device with a minimum packet length of 64 bytes.
Higher-layer processing functions in netfilter (e.g. nf_ip_checksum(),
and help() in nf_conntrack_ftp) assume skb->len reflects the length of
the L3 header and payload, rather than referring back to
ip_hdr->tot_len or ipv6_hdr->payload_len, and get confused by
lower-layer padding.
In the normal IPv4 receive path, ip_rcv() trims the packet to
ip_hdr->tot_len before invoking netfilter hooks. In the IPv6 receive
path, ip6_rcv() does the same using ipv6_hdr->payload_len. Similarly
in the br_netfilter receive path, br_validate_ipv4() and
br_validate_ipv6() trim the packet to the L3 length before invoking
netfilter hooks.
Currently in the OVS conntrack receive path, ovs_ct_execute() pulls
the skb to the L3 header but does not trim it to the L3 length before
calling nf_conntrack_in(NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING). When
nf_conntrack_proto_tcp encounters a packet with lower-layer padding,
nf_ip_checksum() fails causing a "nf_ct_tcp: bad TCP checksum" log
message. While extra zero bytes don't affect the checksum, the length
in the IP pseudoheader does. That length is based on skb->len, and
without trimming, it doesn't match the length the sender used when
computing the checksum.
In ovs_ct_execute(), trim the skb to the L3 length before higher-layer
processing.
Signed-off-by: Ed Swierk <eswierk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
index b27c5c6d9cab..8f04bd6e44bb 100644
--- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
+++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
@@ -1098,6 +1098,36 @@ static int ovs_ct_commit(struct net *net, struct sw_flow_key *key,
return 0;
}
+/* Trim the skb to the length specified by the IP/IPv6 header,
+ * removing any trailing lower-layer padding. This prepares the skb
+ * for higher-layer processing that assumes skb->len excludes padding
+ * (such as nf_ip_checksum). The caller needs to pull the skb to the
+ * network header, and ensure ip_hdr/ipv6_hdr points to valid data.
+ */
+static int ovs_skb_network_trim(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ unsigned int len;
+ int err;
+
+ switch (skb->protocol) {
+ case htons(ETH_P_IP):
+ len = ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->tot_len);
+ break;
+ case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
+ len = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)
+ + ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len);
+ break;
+ default:
+ len = skb->len;
+ }
+
+ err = pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, len);
+ if (err)
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
/* Returns 0 on success, -EINPROGRESS if 'skb' is stolen, or other nonzero
* value if 'skb' is freed.
*/
@@ -1112,6 +1142,10 @@ int ovs_ct_execute(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,
nh_ofs = skb_network_offset(skb);
skb_pull_rcsum(skb, nh_ofs);
+ err = ovs_skb_network_trim(skb);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
if (key->ip.frag != OVS_FRAG_TYPE_NONE) {
err = handle_fragments(net, key, info->zone.id, skb);
if (err)
--
2.15.1