3.2.100-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrew Honig <ahonig@xxxxxxxxxx>
commit 75f139aaf896d6fdeec2e468ddfa4b2fe469bf40 upstream.
This adds a memory barrier when performing a lookup into
the vmcs_field_to_offset_table. This is related to
CVE-2017-5753.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -573,8 +573,18 @@ static const int max_vmcs_field = ARRAY_
static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset(unsigned long field)
{
- if (field >= max_vmcs_field || vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
+ if (field >= max_vmcs_field)
return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753. To be replaced with a
+ * generic mechanism.
+ */
+ asm("lfence");
+
+ if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
+ return -1;
+
return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field];
}