4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
(cherry picked from commit af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881)
Fixes: 117cc7a908c83 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit")
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202191220.blvgkgutojecxr3b@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
[jwang: cherry pick to 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
* On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
* can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
* retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
- * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
*/
static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
{