This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-cpu-bugs-make-retpoline-module-warning-conditional.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
>From foo@baz Fri Feb 23 17:23:58 CET 2018
From: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2018 11:41:57 +0100
Subject: x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional
To: gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Message-ID: <1519382538-15143-9-git-send-email-jinpu.wangl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
(cherry picked from commit e383095c7fe8d218e00ec0f83e4b95ed4e627b02)
If sysfs is disabled and RETPOLINE not defined:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:97:13: warning: ‘spectre_v2_bad_module’ defined but not used
[-Wunused-variable]
static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
Hide it.
Fixes: caf7501a1b4e ("module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module")
Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
[jwang: port to 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -94,9 +94,10 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[]
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
-static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
#ifdef RETPOLINE
+static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
+
bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
{
if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline)
@@ -106,6 +107,13 @@ bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpol
spectre_v2_bad_module = true;
return false;
}
+
+static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void)
+{
+ return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "";
+}
+#else
+static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
#endif
static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
@@ -293,6 +301,6 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
return sprintf(buf, "%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
- spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "");
+ spectre_v2_module_string());
}
#endif
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jinpu.wang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx are
queue-4.4/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch
queue-4.4/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch
queue-4.4/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch
queue-4.4/x86-nospec-fix-header-guards-names.patch
queue-4.4/x86-retpoline-avoid-retpolines-for-built-in-__init-functions.patch
queue-4.4/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch
queue-4.4/kvm-nvmx-invvpid-handling-improvements.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpu-bugs-make-retpoline-module-warning-conditional.patch
queue-4.4/x86-spectre-check-config_retpoline-in-command-line-parser.patch
queue-4.4/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch
queue-4.4/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch
queue-4.4/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch
queue-4.4/x86-spectre-fix-spelling-mistake-vunerable-vulnerable.patch
queue-4.4/kvm-nvmx-fix-kernel-panics-induced-by-illegal-invept-invvpid-types.patch
queue-4.4/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch
queue-4.4/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch
queue-4.4/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch
queue-4.4/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch
queue-4.4/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch
queue-4.4/x86-spectre-simplify-spectre_v2-command-line-parsing.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-fix-typo-ibrs_att-which-should-be-ibrs_all.patch
queue-4.4/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch
queue-4.4/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch
queue-4.4/kvm-async_pf-fix-df-due-to-inject-page-not-present-and-page-ready-exceptions-simultaneously.patch
queue-4.4/kvm-vmx-clean-up-declaration-of-vpid-ept-invalidation-types.patch
queue-4.4/x86-bugs-drop-one-mitigation-from-dmesg.patch
queue-4.4/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch
queue-4.4/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch
queue-4.4/kvm-nvmx-kmap-can-t-fail.patch