This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
>From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:03:21 -0800
Subject: x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
(cherry picked from commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360)
Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections
in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the
kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim
mitigation for __user pointer de-references.
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: linux-arch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: kernel-hardening@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: alan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devic
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
- return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx are
queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch
queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch
queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch
queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch
queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch
queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch
queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch
queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch
queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch
queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch
queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch
queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch
queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch
queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch
queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch
queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch
queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch
queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch
queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch
queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch