4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx>
[ Upstream commit 7c68d1a6b4db9012790af7ac0f0fdc0d2083422a ]
Without proper validation of DODGY packets, we might very well
feed qdisc_pkt_len_init() with invalid GSO packets.
tcp_hdrlen() might access out-of-bound data, so let's use
skb_header_pointer() and proper checks.
Whole story is described in commit d0c081b49137 ("flow_dissector:
properly cap thoff field")
We have the goal of validating DODGY packets earlier in the stack,
so we might very well revert this fix in the future.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: syzbot+9da69ebac7dddd804552@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/core/dev.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -2889,10 +2889,21 @@ static void qdisc_pkt_len_init(struct sk
hdr_len = skb_transport_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb);
/* + transport layer */
- if (likely(shinfo->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 | SKB_GSO_TCPV6)))
- hdr_len += tcp_hdrlen(skb);
- else
- hdr_len += sizeof(struct udphdr);
+ if (likely(shinfo->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 | SKB_GSO_TCPV6))) {
+ const struct tcphdr *th;
+ struct tcphdr _tcphdr;
+
+ th = skb_header_pointer(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb),
+ sizeof(_tcphdr), &_tcphdr);
+ if (likely(th))
+ hdr_len += __tcp_hdrlen(th);
+ } else {
+ struct udphdr _udphdr;
+
+ if (skb_header_pointer(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb),
+ sizeof(_udphdr), &_udphdr))
+ hdr_len += sizeof(struct udphdr);
+ }
if (shinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_DODGY)
gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len - hdr_len,