Re: [PATCH] general protection fault in sock_has_perm

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On 01/19/2018 09:19 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
On Thu, 2018-01-18 at 13:58 -0800, Mark Salyzyn wrote:
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
. . .

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8644d864e3c1..95d7c8143373 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4342,7 +4342,7 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32
perms)
  	struct common_audit_data ad;
  	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
- if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
+	if (!sksec || sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
  		return 0;
The patch description says "null check the sk_security, and if the
case, reject the permissions."  The patch code instead has it return
0/success, i.e. permission granted.  Which one is correct?
<oops> -EACCESS would be advised, yes. THANKS.

<please remove my mistake from my permanent record ;-} >
If we
return -EACCES, then we might break userspace; if we return 0, we might
be allowing an operation that should have been denied.  Both seem like
losing propositions.
if the sk_security is NULL, it is in-effect a form of UAF, so kernel _and_ user space is already 'sick'. I think it is a significantly larger losing proposition to panic the kernel? Reporting -EACCESS (as was proper) is a error propagation way to let user space deal with the erroneous condition.


Could we instead have selinux_sk_free_security() defer freeing of the
sock security blob to a call_rcu(), like we did for
inode_free_security, or change the caller of it to not free it until
the sock is truly freed?

AFAIK the upper issue is the premature closing on an RCU protected object, and the _right_ answer is that its call should have been properly deferred to a synchronization or grace period. Having sk_free_security be deferred by the grace period runs the risk that it is in a race with the proper deletion of a languishing read object in an RCU. It is a bug in the upper layers. My proposal in this KISS stability patch is to make security deal with those bugs gracefully until all those issues are fixed (in ToT).

-- Mark



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