From: Andy Whitcroft <apw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> This patch has been added to the stable tree. If you have any objections, please let us know. =============== [ Upstream commit 677e806da4d916052585301785d847c3b3e6186a ] When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated buffer. However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call. There we again validate the size of the supplied buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents. We do not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated memory. This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by netlink packets. This leads to memory corruption and the potential for priviledge escalation. We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the user is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained replay_window. CVE-2017-7184 Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@xxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 18d9cf2eb648..177cb17cf09c 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -389,6 +389,9 @@ static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_es if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen) return -EINVAL; + if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; } -- 2.11.0