From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
commit bbeb6e4323dad9b5e0ee9f60c223dd532e2403b1 upstream.
syzkaller tried to alloc a map with 0xfffffffd entries out of a userns,
and thus unprivileged. With the recently added logic in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") we round this up to the next
power of two value for max_entries for unprivileged such that we can
apply proper masking into potentially zeroed out map slots.
However, this will generate an index_mask of 0xffffffff, and therefore
a + 1 will let this overflow into new max_entries of 0. This will pass
allocation, etc, and later on map access we still enforce on the original
attr->max_entries value which was 0xfffffffd, therefore triggering GPF
all over the place. Thus bail out on overflow in such case.
Moreover, on 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() can also not be used,
since fls_long(max_entries - 1) can result in 32 and 1UL << 32 in 32 bit
space is undefined. Therefore, do this by hand in a 64 bit variable.
This fixes all the issues triggered by syzkaller's reproducers.
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: syzbot+b0efb8e572d01bce1ae0@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Reported-by: syzbot+6c15e9744f75f2364773@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Reported-by: syzbot+d2f5524fb46fd3b312ee@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Reported-by: syzbot+61d23c95395cc90dbc2b@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Reported-by: syzbot+0d363c942452cca68c01@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
---
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
index 56f8a8306a49..3608fa1aec8a 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
u32 elem_size, array_size, index_mask, max_entries;
bool unpriv = !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
struct bpf_array *array;
+ u64 mask64;
/* check sanity of attributes */
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
@@ -38,13 +39,25 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
elem_size = round_up(attr->value_size, 8);
max_entries = attr->max_entries;
- index_mask = roundup_pow_of_two(max_entries) - 1;
- if (unpriv)
+ /* On 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() with max_entries that has
+ * upper most bit set in u32 space is undefined behavior due to
+ * resulting 1U << 32, so do it manually here in u64 space.
+ */
+ mask64 = fls_long(max_entries - 1);
+ mask64 = 1ULL << mask64;
+ mask64 -= 1;
+
+ index_mask = mask64;
+ if (unpriv) {
/* round up array size to nearest power of 2,
* since cpu will speculate within index_mask limits
*/
max_entries = index_mask + 1;
+ /* Check for overflows. */
+ if (max_entries < attr->max_entries)
+ return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
+ }
/* check round_up into zero and u32 overflow */
if (elem_size == 0 ||
--
2.15.1