From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
[ Upstream commit 179d1c5602997fef5a940c6ddcf31212cbfebd14 ]
This could be made safe by passing through a reference to env and checking
for env->allow_ptr_leaks, but it would only work one way and is probably
not worth the hassle - not doing it will not directly lead to program
rejection.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 15 +++++++--------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 8c35355..5a30eda 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3337,15 +3337,14 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
} else {
- /* if we knew anything about the old value, we're not
- * equal, because we can't know anything about the
- * scalar value of the pointer in the new value.
+ /* We're trying to use a pointer in place of a scalar.
+ * Even if the scalar was unbounded, this could lead to
+ * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak
+ * while pointers are not. We could make this safe in
+ * special cases if root is calling us, but it's
+ * probably not worth the hassle.
*/
- return rold->umin_value == 0 &&
- rold->umax_value == U64_MAX &&
- rold->smin_value == S64_MIN &&
- rold->smax_value == S64_MAX &&
- tnum_is_unknown(rold->var_off);
+ return false;
}
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
/* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and
--
2.9.5