[PATCH 4.14 075/159] x86/unwinder/orc: Dont bail on stack overflow

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4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit d3a09104018cf2ad5973dfa8a9c138ef9f5015a3 upstream.

If the stack overflows into a guard page and the ORC unwinder should work
well: by construction, there can't be any meaningful data in the guard page
because no writes to the guard page will have succeeded.

But there is a bug that prevents unwinding from working correctly: if the
starting register state has RSP pointing into a stack guard page, the ORC
unwinder bails out immediately.

Instead of bailing out immediately check whether the next page up is a
valid check page and if so analyze that. As a result the ORC unwinder will
start the unwind.

Tested by intentionally overflowing the task stack.  The result is an
accurate call trace instead of a trace consisting purely of '?' entries.

There are a few other bugs that are triggered if the unwinder encounters a
stack overflow after the first step, but they are outside the scope of this
fix.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
Cc: aliguori@xxxxxxxxxx
Cc: daniel.gruss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: hughd@xxxxxxxxxx
Cc: keescook@xxxxxxxxxx
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150604.991389777@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c |   14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
@@ -553,8 +553,18 @@ void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state
 	}
 
 	if (get_stack_info((unsigned long *)state->sp, state->task,
-			   &state->stack_info, &state->stack_mask))
-		return;
+			   &state->stack_info, &state->stack_mask)) {
+		/*
+		 * We weren't on a valid stack.  It's possible that
+		 * we overflowed a valid stack into a guard page.
+		 * See if the next page up is valid so that we can
+		 * generate some kind of backtrace if this happens.
+		 */
+		void *next_page = (void *)PAGE_ALIGN((unsigned long)state->sp);
+		if (get_stack_info(next_page, state->task, &state->stack_info,
+				   &state->stack_mask))
+			return;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * The caller can provide the address of the first frame directly





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