This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
X.509: reject invalid BIT STRING for subjectPublicKey
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x.509-reject-invalid-bit-string-for-subjectpublickey.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
>From 0f30cbea005bd3077bd98cd29277d7fc2699c1da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 15:13:27 +0000
Subject: X.509: reject invalid BIT STRING for subjectPublicKey
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
commit 0f30cbea005bd3077bd98cd29277d7fc2699c1da upstream.
Adding a specially crafted X.509 certificate whose subjectPublicKey
ASN.1 value is zero-length caused x509_extract_key_data() to set the
public key size to SIZE_MAX, as it subtracted the nonexistent BIT STRING
metadata byte. Then, x509_cert_parse() called kmemdup() with that bogus
size, triggering the WARN_ON_ONCE() in kmalloc_slab().
This appears to be harmless, but it still must be fixed since WARNs are
never supposed to be user-triggerable.
Fix it by updating x509_cert_parse() to validate that the value has a
BIT STRING metadata byte, and that the byte is 0 which indicates that
the number of bits in the bitstring is a multiple of 8.
It would be nice to handle the metadata byte in asn1_ber_decoder()
instead. But that would be tricky because in the general case a BIT
STRING could be implicitly tagged, and/or could legitimately have a
length that is not a whole number of bytes.
Here was the WARN (cleaned up slightly):
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 202 at mm/slab_common.c:971 kmalloc_slab+0x5d/0x70 mm/slab_common.c:971
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 202 Comm: keyctl Tainted: G B 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
task: ffff880033014180 task.stack: ffff8800305c8000
Call Trace:
__do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3706 [inline]
__kmalloc_track_caller+0x22/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3726
kmemdup+0x17/0x40 mm/util.c:118
kmemdup include/linux/string.h:414 [inline]
x509_cert_parse+0x2cb/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:106
x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850
SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Fixes: 42d5ec27f873 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -409,6 +409,8 @@ int x509_extract_key_data(void *context,
ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "rsa";
/* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */
+ if (vlen < 1 || *(const u8 *)value != 0)
+ return -EBADMSG;
ctx->key = value + 1;
ctx->key_size = vlen - 1;
return 0;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx are
queue-4.14/x.509-reject-invalid-bit-string-for-subjectpublickey.patch
queue-4.14/asn.1-check-for-error-from-asn1_op_end__act-actions.patch
queue-4.14/keys-add-missing-permission-check-for-request_key-destination.patch
queue-4.14/asn.1-fix-out-of-bounds-read-when-parsing-indefinite-length-item.patch
queue-4.14/keys-reject-null-restriction-string-when-type-is-specified.patch
queue-4.14/x.509-fix-comparisons-of-pkey_algo.patch