This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled net: Set sk_prot_creator when cloning sockets to the right proto to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is: net-set-sk_prot_creator-when-cloning-sockets-to-the-right-proto.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it. >From foo@baz Tue Oct 10 16:09:22 CEST 2017 From: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@xxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue, 26 Sep 2017 17:38:50 -0700 Subject: net: Set sk_prot_creator when cloning sockets to the right proto From: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@xxxxxxxxx> [ Upstream commit 9d538fa60bad4f7b23193c89e843797a1cf71ef3 ] sk->sk_prot and sk->sk_prot_creator can differ when the app uses IPV6_ADDRFORM (transforming an IPv6-socket to an IPv4-one). Which is why sk_prot_creator is there to make sure that sk_prot_free() does the kmem_cache_free() on the right kmem_cache slab. Now, if such a socket gets transformed back to a listening socket (using connect() with AF_UNSPEC) we will allocate an IPv4 tcp_sock through sk_clone_lock() when a new connection comes in. But sk_prot_creator will still point to the IPv6 kmem_cache (as everything got copied in sk_clone_lock()). When freeing, we will thus put this memory back into the IPv6 kmem_cache although it was allocated in the IPv4 cache. I have seen memory corruption happening because of this. With slub-debugging and MEMCG_KMEM enabled this gives the warning "cache_from_obj: Wrong slab cache. TCPv6 but object is from TCP" A C-program to trigger this: void main(void) { int fd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP); int new_fd, newest_fd, client_fd; struct sockaddr_in6 bind_addr; struct sockaddr_in bind_addr4, client_addr1, client_addr2; struct sockaddr unsp; int val; memset(&bind_addr, 0, sizeof(bind_addr)); bind_addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6; bind_addr.sin6_port = ntohs(42424); memset(&client_addr1, 0, sizeof(client_addr1)); client_addr1.sin_family = AF_INET; client_addr1.sin_port = ntohs(42424); client_addr1.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); memset(&client_addr2, 0, sizeof(client_addr2)); client_addr2.sin_family = AF_INET; client_addr2.sin_port = ntohs(42421); client_addr2.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); memset(&unsp, 0, sizeof(unsp)); unsp.sa_family = AF_UNSPEC; bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&bind_addr, sizeof(bind_addr)); listen(fd, 5); client_fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP); connect(client_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&client_addr1, sizeof(client_addr1)); new_fd = accept(fd, NULL, NULL); close(fd); val = AF_INET; setsockopt(new_fd, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_ADDRFORM, &val, sizeof(val)); connect(new_fd, &unsp, sizeof(unsp)); memset(&bind_addr4, 0, sizeof(bind_addr4)); bind_addr4.sin_family = AF_INET; bind_addr4.sin_port = ntohs(42421); bind(new_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&bind_addr4, sizeof(bind_addr4)); listen(new_fd, 5); client_fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP); connect(client_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&client_addr2, sizeof(client_addr2)); newest_fd = accept(new_fd, NULL, NULL); close(new_fd); close(client_fd); close(new_fd); } As far as I can see, this bug has been there since the beginning of the git-days. Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@xxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- net/core/sock.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -1493,6 +1493,8 @@ struct sock *sk_clone_lock(const struct sock_copy(newsk, sk); + newsk->sk_prot_creator = sk->sk_prot; + /* SANITY */ if (likely(newsk->sk_net_refcnt)) get_net(sock_net(newsk)); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from cpaasch@xxxxxxxxx are queue-4.9/net-set-sk_prot_creator-when-cloning-sockets-to-the-right-proto.patch