This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
to the 4.13-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
keys-prevent-creating-a-different-user-s-keyrings.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.13 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
>From 237bbd29f7a049d310d907f4b2716a7feef9abf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2017 11:37:03 -0700
Subject: KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
commit 237bbd29f7a049d310d907f4b2716a7feef9abf3 upstream.
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user. For example:
sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
sleep 15' &
sleep 1
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us
This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:
-4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000
-5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000
Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.
Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
include/linux/key.h | 2 ++
security/keys/internal.h | 2 +-
security/keys/key.c | 2 ++
security/keys/keyring.c | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
security/keys/process_keys.c | 6 ++++--
5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ struct key {
#define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN 8 /* set if key is built in to the kernel */
#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL 9 /* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */
#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP 10 /* set if key should not be removed */
+#define KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING 11 /* set if key is a user or user session keyring */
/* the key type and key description string
* - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria
@@ -243,6 +244,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_
#define KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA 0x0002 /* not in quota */
#define KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN 0x0004 /* Key is built into kernel */
#define KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION 0x0008 /* Override the check on restricted keyrings */
+#define KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING 0x0010 /* allocating a user or user session keyring */
extern void key_revoke(struct key *key);
extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key);
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_
extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
-extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check);
+extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring);
extern int install_user_keyrings(void);
extern int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *);
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -302,6 +302,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *t
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN)
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN;
+ if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING)
+ key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING;
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1097,15 +1097,15 @@ found:
/*
* Find a keyring with the specified name.
*
- * All named keyrings in the current user namespace are searched, provided they
- * grant Search permission directly to the caller (unless this check is
- * skipped). Keyrings whose usage points have reached zero or who have been
- * revoked are skipped.
+ * Only keyrings that have nonzero refcount, are not revoked, and are owned by a
+ * user in the current user namespace are considered. If @uid_keyring is %true,
+ * the keyring additionally must have been allocated as a user or user session
+ * keyring; otherwise, it must grant Search permission directly to the caller.
*
* Returns a pointer to the keyring with the keyring's refcount having being
* incremented on success. -ENOKEY is returned if a key could not be found.
*/
-struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
+struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring)
{
struct key *keyring;
int bucket;
@@ -1133,10 +1133,15 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const c
if (strcmp(keyring->description, name) != 0)
continue;
- if (!skip_perm_check &&
- key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
- KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
- continue;
+ if (uid_keyring) {
+ if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING,
+ &keyring->flags))
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ if (key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
+ KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
+ continue;
+ }
/* we've got a match but we might end up racing with
* key_cleanup() if the keyring is currently 'dead'
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
cred, user_keyring_perm,
- KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
+ KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |
+ KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);
@@ -94,7 +95,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
session_keyring =
keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
cred, user_keyring_perm,
- KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
+ KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |
+ KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx are
queue-4.13/keys-prevent-creating-a-different-user-s-keyrings.patch
queue-4.13/keys-fix-writing-past-end-of-user-supplied-buffer-in-keyring_read.patch