From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
In keyring_search_iterator() and in wait_for_key_construction(), we
check whether the key has been negatively instantiated, and if so return
the key's ->reject_error.
However, no lock is held during this, and ->reject_error is in union
with ->payload. And it's impossible for KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE to be updated
atomically with respect to ->reject_error and ->payload.
Most problematically, when a negative key is positively instantiated via
__key_update() (via sys_add_key()), ->payload is initialized first, then
KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE is cleared. But that means that ->reject_error can be
observed to have a bogus value, having been overwritten with ->payload,
while the key still appears to be "negative". Clearing
KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE first wouldn't work either, since then anyone who
accesses the payload under rcu_read_lock() rather than the key semaphore
might observe an uninitialized ->payload. Nor can we just always take
the key's semaphore when checking whether the key is negative, since
keyring searches happen under rcu_read_lock().
Therefore, fix the bug by moving ->reject_error into the high bits of
->flags so that we can read and write it atomically with respect to
KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED.
This will also allow KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE to be removed, since tests for
KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE can be replaced with tests for nonzero reject_error.
But for ease of backporting this fix, that is left for a later patch.
This fixes a kernel crash caused by the following program:
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(void)
{
int ringid = keyctl_join_session_keyring(NULL);
if (fork()) {
for (;;) {
usleep(rand() % 4096);
add_key("user", "desc", "x", 1, ringid);
keyctl_clear(ringid);
}
} else {
for (;;)
request_key("user", "desc", "", ringid);
}
}
Here is the crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffffd39a6b0
IP: __key_link_begin+0x0/0x100
PGD 7a0a067 P4D 7a0a067 PUD 7a0c067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 165 Comm: keyctl_negate_r Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1 #377
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014
task: ffff9791fd809140 task.stack: ffffacba402bc000
RIP: 0010:__key_link_begin+0x0/0x100
RSP: 0018:ffffacba402bfdc8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: ffff9791fd809140 RBX: fffffffffd39a620 RCX: 0000000000000008
RDX: ffffacba402bfdd0 RSI: fffffffffd39a6a0 RDI: ffff9791fd810600
RBP: ffffacba402bfdf8 R08: 0000000000000063 R09: ffffffff94845620
R10: 8080808080808080 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: ffff9791fd810600
R13: ffff9791fd39a940 R14: fffffffffd39a6a0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fbf14a90740(0000) GS:ffff9791ffd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: fffffffffd39a6b0 CR3: 000000003b910003 CR4: 00000000003606e0
Call Trace:
? key_link+0x28/0xb0
? search_process_keyrings+0x13/0x100
request_key_and_link+0xcb/0x550
? keyring_instantiate+0x110/0x110
? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
SyS_request_key+0xc0/0x160
? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x5e/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
RIP: 0033:0x7fbf14190bb9
RSP: 002b:00007ffd8e4fe6c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000f9
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000036cc28fb RCX: 00007fbf14190bb9
RDX: 000055748b56ca4a RSI: 000055748b56ca46 RDI: 000055748b56ca4b
RBP: 000055748b56ca4a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000036cc28fb R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055748b56c8b0
R13: 00007ffd8e4fe7d0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: c5 0f 85 69 ff ff ff 48 c7 c3 82 ff ff ff eb ab 45 31 ed e9 18 ff ff ff 85 c0 75 8d eb d2 0f 1f 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 <48> 83 7e 10 00 0f 84 c5 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55
RIP: __key_link_begin+0x0/0x100 RSP: ffffacba402bfdc8
CR2: fffffffffd39a6b0
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> [v4.4+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
include/linux/key.h | 12 +++++++++++-
security/keys/key.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++-------
security/keys/keyctl.c | 3 +++
security/keys/keyring.c | 4 ++--
security/keys/request_key.c | 11 +++++++----
5 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index e315e16b6ff8..b7b590d7c480 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -189,6 +189,17 @@ struct key {
#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP 10 /* set if key should not be removed */
#define KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING 11 /* set if key is a user or user session keyring */
+ /*
+ * If the key is negatively instantiated, then bits 20-31 hold the error
+ * code which should be returned when someone tries to use the key
+ * (unless they allow negative keys). The error code is stored as a
+ * positive number, so it must be negated before being returned.
+ *
+ * Note that a key can go from negative to positive but not vice versa.
+ */
+#define KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_SHIFT 20
+#define KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK 0xFFF00000
+
/* the key type and key description string
* - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria
* - it should be a printable string
@@ -213,7 +224,6 @@ struct key {
struct list_head name_link;
struct assoc_array keys;
};
- int reject_error;
};
/* This is set on a keyring to restrict the addition of a link to a key
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index eb914a838840..3ffb6829972f 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -401,6 +401,20 @@ int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_payload_reserve);
+static void mark_key_instantiated(struct key *key, unsigned int reject_error)
+{
+ unsigned long old, new;
+
+ do {
+ old = READ_ONCE(key->flags);
+ new = (old & ~(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE |
+ KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK)) |
+ KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED |
+ (reject_error ? KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE : 0) |
+ (reject_error << KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_SHIFT);
+ } while (cmpxchg_release(&key->flags, old, new) != old);
+}
+
/*
* Instantiate a key and link it into the target keyring atomically. Must be
* called with the target keyring's semaphore writelocked. The target key's
@@ -431,7 +445,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
if (ret == 0) {
/* mark the key as being instantiated */
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
- set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
+ mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
awaken = 1;
@@ -580,10 +594,8 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
/* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
- key->reject_error = -error;
- smp_wmb();
- set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
- set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
+ mark_key_instantiated(key, error);
+
now = current_kernel_time();
key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
@@ -753,7 +765,7 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref,
ret = key->type->update(key, prep);
if (ret == 0)
/* updating a negative key instantiates it */
- clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
+ mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
up_write(&key->sem);
@@ -987,7 +999,7 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
ret = key->type->update(key, &prep);
if (ret == 0)
/* updating a negative key instantiates it */
- clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
+ mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
up_write(&key->sem);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 365ff85d7e27..19a09e121089 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1223,6 +1223,9 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error,
error == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
return -EINVAL;
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(MAX_ERRNO > (KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK >>
+ KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_SHIFT));
+
/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
* assumed before calling this */
ret = -EPERM;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 4fa82a8a9c0e..7fc661f492d3 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -598,8 +598,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) {
/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) {
- smp_rmb();
- ctx->result = ERR_PTR(key->reject_error);
+ ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-(int)(kflags >>
+ KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_SHIFT));
kleave(" = %d [neg]", ctx->skipped_ret);
goto skipped;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 63e63a42db3c..0aab68344837 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -590,15 +590,18 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)
{
int ret;
+ unsigned long flags;
ret = wait_on_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT,
intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
if (ret)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
- smp_rmb();
- return key->reject_error;
- }
+
+ /* Pairs with RELEASE in mark_key_instantiated() */
+ flags = smp_load_acquire(&key->flags);
+ if (flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE))
+ return -(int)(flags >> KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_SHIFT);
+
return key_validate(key);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction);
--
2.14.1.992.g2c7b836f3a-goog