Commit 0a1eb2d474ed ("fs/proc: Stop reporting eip and esp in
/proc/PID/stat") stopped reporting eip/esp because it is
racey and dangerous for executing tasks. The comment adds:
As far as I know, there are no use programs that make any
material use of these fields, so just get rid of them.
However, existing userspace core-dump-handler applications (for
example, minicoredumper) are using these fields since they
provide an excellent cross-platform interface to these valuable
pointers. So that commit introduced a user space visible
regression.
Partially revert the change and make the readout possible for
tasks with the proper permissions and only if the target task
has the PF_DUMPCORE flag set.
Reported-by: Marco Felsch <marco.felsch@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Fixes: 0a1eb2d474ed ("fs/proc: Stop reporting eip and esp in> /proc/PID/stat")
---
fs/proc/array.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index 88c3555..696cc68 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -421,7 +421,15 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
* esp and eip are intentionally zeroed out. There is no
* non-racy way to read them without freezing the task.
* Programs that need reliable values can use ptrace(2).
+ *
+ * The only exception is if the task is core dumping because
+ * a program is not able to use ptrace(2) in that case. It is
+ * safe because the task has stopped executing permanently.
*/
+ if (permitted && (task->flags & PF_DUMPCORE)) {
+ eip = KSTK_EIP(task);
+ esp = KSTK_ESP(task);
+ }
}
get_task_comm(tcomm, task);
--
1.7.10.4