3.2.93-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
commit 5649645d725c73df4302428ee4e02c869248b4c5 upstream.
sys_add_key() and the KEYCTL_UPDATE operation of sys_keyctl() allowed a
NULL payload with nonzero length to be passed to the key type's
->preparse(), ->instantiate(), and/or ->update() methods. Various key
types including asymmetric, cifs.idmap, cifs.spnego, and pkcs7_test did
not handle this case, allowing an unprivileged user to trivially cause a
NULL pointer dereference (kernel oops) if one of these key types was
present. Fix it by doing the copy_from_user() when 'plen' is nonzero
rather than when '_payload' is non-NULL, causing the syscall to fail
with EFAULT as expected when an invalid buffer is specified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@xxxxxxxxxx>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
security/keys/keyctl.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __us
payload = NULL;
vm = false;
- if (_payload) {
+ if (plen) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!payload) {
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
payload = NULL;
- if (_payload) {
+ if (plen) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!payload)