This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
tracing: Change event_enable/disable_read() to verify i_private != NULL
to the 3.10-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
tracing-change-event_enable-disable_read-to-verify-i_private-null.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.10 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
>From bc6f6b08dee5645770efb4b76186ded313f23752 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 26 Jul 2013 19:25:36 +0200
Subject: tracing: Change event_enable/disable_read() to verify i_private != NULL
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx>
commit bc6f6b08dee5645770efb4b76186ded313f23752 upstream.
tracing_open_generic_file() is racy, ftrace_event_file can be
already freed by rmdir or trace_remove_event_call().
Change event_enable_read() and event_disable_read() to read and
verify "file = i_private" under event_mutex.
This fixes nothing, but now we can change debugfs_remove("enable")
callers to nullify ->i_private and fix the the problem.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130726172536.GA3612@xxxxxxxxxx
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/trace/trace_events.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
@@ -682,13 +682,23 @@ static ssize_t
event_enable_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf, size_t cnt,
loff_t *ppos)
{
- struct ftrace_event_file *file = filp->private_data;
+ struct ftrace_event_file *file;
+ unsigned long flags;
char *buf;
- if (file->flags & FTRACE_EVENT_FL_ENABLED) {
- if (file->flags & FTRACE_EVENT_FL_SOFT_DISABLED)
+ mutex_lock(&event_mutex);
+ file = event_file_data(filp);
+ if (likely(file))
+ flags = file->flags;
+ mutex_unlock(&event_mutex);
+
+ if (!file)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (flags & FTRACE_EVENT_FL_ENABLED) {
+ if (flags & FTRACE_EVENT_FL_SOFT_DISABLED)
buf = "0*\n";
- else if (file->flags & FTRACE_EVENT_FL_SOFT_MODE)
+ else if (flags & FTRACE_EVENT_FL_SOFT_MODE)
buf = "1*\n";
else
buf = "1\n";
@@ -702,13 +712,10 @@ static ssize_t
event_enable_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf, size_t cnt,
loff_t *ppos)
{
- struct ftrace_event_file *file = filp->private_data;
+ struct ftrace_event_file *file;
unsigned long val;
int ret;
- if (!file)
- return -EINVAL;
-
ret = kstrtoul_from_user(ubuf, cnt, 10, &val);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -720,8 +727,11 @@ event_enable_write(struct file *filp, co
switch (val) {
case 0:
case 1:
+ ret = -ENODEV;
mutex_lock(&event_mutex);
- ret = ftrace_event_enable_disable(file, val);
+ file = event_file_data(filp);
+ if (likely(file))
+ ret = ftrace_event_enable_disable(file, val);
mutex_unlock(&event_mutex);
break;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from oleg@xxxxxxxxxx are
queue-3.10/tracing-introduce-trace_create_cpu_file-and.patch
queue-3.10/tracing-introduce-remove_event_file_dir.patch
queue-3.10/tracing-change-event_filter_read-write-to-verify-i_private-null.patch
queue-3.10/tracing-change-tracing_fops-snapshot_fops-to-rely-on-tracing_get_cpu.patch
queue-3.10/tracing-change-tracing_buffers_fops-to-rely-on-tracing_get_cpu.patch
queue-3.10/tracing-change-f_start-to-take-event_mutex-and-verify-i_private-null.patch
queue-3.10/tracing-change-event_enable-disable_read-to-verify-i_private-null.patch
queue-3.10/tracing-change-tracing_stats_fops-to-rely-on.patch
queue-3.10/tracing-change-tracing_pipe_fops-to-rely-on-tracing_get_cpu.patch
queue-3.10/tracing-change-tracing_entries_fops-to-rely-on-tracing_get_cpu.patch
queue-3.10/tracing-turn-event-id-i_private-into-call-event.type.patch
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