This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
NFSv4: Don't perform cached access checks before we've OPENed the file
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
nfsv4-don-t-perform-cached-access-checks-before-we-ve-opened-the-file.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
>From 762674f86d0328d5dc923c966e209e1ee59663f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Sat, 26 Dec 2015 21:54:58 -0500
Subject: NFSv4: Don't perform cached access checks before we've OPENed the file
From: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
commit 762674f86d0328d5dc923c966e209e1ee59663f2 upstream.
Donald Buczek reports that a nfs4 client incorrectly denies
execute access based on outdated file mode (missing 'x' bit).
After the mode on the server is 'fixed' (chmod +x) further execution
attempts continue to fail, because the nfs ACCESS call updates
the access parameter but not the mode parameter or the mode in
the inode.
The root cause is ultimately that the VFS is calling may_open()
before the NFS client has a chance to OPEN the file and hence revalidate
the access and attribute caches.
Al Viro suggests:
>>> Make nfs_permission() relax the checks when it sees MAY_OPEN, if you know
>>> that things will be caught by server anyway?
>>
>> That can work as long as we're guaranteed that everything that calls
>> inode_permission() with MAY_OPEN on a regular file will also follow up
>> with a vfs_open() or dentry_open() on success. Is this always the
>> case?
>
> 1) in do_tmpfile(), followed by do_dentry_open() (not reachable by NFS since
> it doesn't have ->tmpfile() instance anyway)
>
> 2) in atomic_open(), after the call of ->atomic_open() has succeeded.
>
> 3) in do_last(), followed on success by vfs_open()
>
> That's all. All calls of inode_permission() that get MAY_OPEN come from
> may_open(), and there's no other callers of that puppy.
Reported-by: Donald Buczek <buczek@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109771
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1451046656-26319-1-git-send-email-buczek@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/nfs/dir.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/nfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c
@@ -2452,6 +2452,9 @@ int nfs_permission(struct inode *inode,
case S_IFLNK:
goto out;
case S_IFREG:
+ if ((mask & MAY_OPEN) &&
+ nfs_server_capable(inode, NFS_CAP_ATOMIC_OPEN))
+ return 0;
break;
case S_IFDIR:
/*
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from trond.myklebust@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx are
queue-4.4/nfsd-fix-up-the-supattr_exclcreat-attributes.patch
queue-4.4/nfsv4-don-t-perform-cached-access-checks-before-we-ve-opened-the-file.patch
queue-4.4/nfs-ensure-we-revalidate-attributes-before-using-execute_ok.patch