Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: David Safford <safford@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: keyrings@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx --- security/keys/trusted.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 2ae31c5a87de..df7d30b0a6f7 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ * See Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt */ +#include <crypto/algapi.h> #include <crypto/hash_info.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/module.h> @@ -243,7 +244,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, if (ret < 0) goto out; - if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) + if (crypto_memneq(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) ret = -EINVAL; out: kfree(sdesc); @@ -335,7 +336,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0); if (ret < 0) goto out; - if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) { + if (crypto_memneq(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } @@ -344,7 +345,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0); if (ret < 0) goto out; - if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) + if (crypto_memneq(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) ret = -EINVAL; out: kfree(sdesc); -- 2.13.1