From: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@xxxxxxxxxxx> If "i" is the last element in the vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[] array, it potentially can be exploited the vulnerability. this will out-of-bounds read and write the unused memory in host OS. As Paolo pointed: >> /* when no next entry is found, the current entry[i] is reselected */ >> - for (j = i + 1; ; j = (j + 1) % nent) { >> - struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *ej = &vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[j]; >> - if (ej->function == e->function) { > >It reads ej->maxphyaddr, which is user controlled. > >> - ej->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATE_READ_NEXT; > >After cpuid_entries there is > > int maxphyaddr; > struct x86_emulate_ctxt emulate_ctxt; /* 16-byte aligned */ > >So indeed we have: > >- cpuid_entries at offset 1B50 (6992) >- maxphyaddr at offset 27D0 (6992 + 3200 = 10192) >- padding at 27D4...27DF >- emulate_ctxt at 27E0 > >So this indeed writes in the padding. Pfew, writing the ops field of >emulate_ctxt would have been much worse. This patch fixes it by modding the index to avoid the out-of-bounds. At the worst case, i == j and ej->function == e->function, the loop can bail out. Reported-by: Moguofang <moguofang@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Moguofang <moguofang@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@xxxxxxxxxxx> --- v1 -> v2: * update patch description arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index a181ae7..b927a42 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -779,19 +779,20 @@ int kvm_dev_ioctl_get_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid, static int move_to_next_stateful_cpuid_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int i) { + int j = i, nent = vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent; struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e = &vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[i]; - int j, nent = vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent; + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *ej; e->flags &= ~KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATE_READ_NEXT; /* when no next entry is found, the current entry[i] is reselected */ - for (j = i + 1; ; j = (j + 1) % nent) { - struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *ej = &vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[j]; - if (ej->function == e->function) { - ej->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATE_READ_NEXT; - return j; - } - } - return 0; /* silence gcc, even though control never reaches here */ + do { + j = (j + 1) % nent; + ej = &vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[j]; + } while(ej->function != e->function); + + ej->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATE_READ_NEXT; + + return j; } /* find an entry with matching function, matching index (if needed), and that -- 2.7.4