4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@xxxxxxxxxx>
commit abfa7f4357e3640fdee87dfc276fd0f379fb5ae6 upstream.
__test_aead() reads MAX_IVLEN bytes from template[i].iv, but the
actual length of the initialisation vector can be shorter.
The length of the IV is already calculated earlier in the
function. Let's just reuses that. Also the IV length is currently
calculated several time for no reason. Let's fix that too.
This fix an out-of-bound error detected by KASan.
Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
crypto/testmgr.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -488,6 +488,8 @@ static int __test_aead(struct crypto_aea
aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
tcrypt_complete, &result);
+ iv_len = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
if (template[i].np)
continue;
@@ -508,7 +510,6 @@ static int __test_aead(struct crypto_aea
memcpy(input, template[i].input, template[i].ilen);
memcpy(assoc, template[i].assoc, template[i].alen);
- iv_len = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
if (template[i].iv)
memcpy(iv, template[i].iv, iv_len);
else
@@ -617,7 +618,7 @@ static int __test_aead(struct crypto_aea
j++;
if (template[i].iv)
- memcpy(iv, template[i].iv, MAX_IVLEN);
+ memcpy(iv, template[i].iv, iv_len);
else
memset(iv, 0, MAX_IVLEN);