[PATCH 1/4] perf: Fix use-after-free in perf_release()

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Dmitry reported syzcaller tripped a use-after-free in perf_release().

After much puzzlement Oleg spotted the below scenario:


  Task1                           Task2

  fork()
    perf_event_init_task()
    /* ... */
    goto bad_fork_$foo;
    /* ... */
    perf_event_free_task()
      mutex_lock(ctx->lock)
      perf_free_event(B)

                                  perf_event_release_kernel(A)
                                    mutex_lock(A->child_mutex)
                                    list_for_each_entry(child, ...) {
                                      /* child == B */
                                      ctx = B->ctx;
                                      get_ctx(ctx);
                                      mutex_unlock(A->child_mutex);

        mutex_lock(A->child_mutex)
        list_del_init(B->child_list)
        mutex_unlock(A->child_mutex)

        /* ... */

      mutex_unlock(ctx->lock);
      put_ctx() /* >0 */
    free_task();
                                      mutex_lock(ctx->lock);
                                      mutex_lock(A->child_mutex);
                                      /* ... */
                                      mutex_unlock(A->child_mutex);
                                      mutex_unlock(ctx->lock)
                                      put_ctx() /* 0 */
                                        ctx->task && !TOMBSTONE
                                          put_task_struct() /* UAF */


This patch closes the hole by making perf_event_free_task() destroy the
task <-> ctx relation such that perf_event_release_kernel() will no longer
observe the now dead task.


Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Fixes: c6e5b73242d2 ("perf: Synchronously clean up child events")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx>
Spotted-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170314155949.GE32474@worktop
---
 kernel/events/core.c |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -10556,6 +10556,17 @@ void perf_event_free_task(struct task_st
 			continue;
 
 		mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
+		raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
+		/*
+		 * Destroy the task <-> ctx relation and mark the context dead.
+		 *
+		 * This is important because even though the task hasn't been
+		 * exposed yet the context has been (through child_list).
+		 */
+		RCU_INIT_POINTER(task->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn], NULL);
+		WRITE_ONCE(ctx->task, TASK_TOMBSTONE);
+		put_task_struct(task); /* cannot be last */
+		raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
 again:
 		list_for_each_entry_safe(event, tmp, &ctx->pinned_groups,
 				group_entry)





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