3.16.40-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@xxxxxxxxx> commit bf911e985d6bbaa328c20c3e05f4eb03de11fdd6 upstream. Andrey Konovalov reported that KASAN detected that SCTP was using a slab beyond the boundaries. It was caused because when handling out of the blue packets in function sctp_sf_ootb() it was checking the chunk len only after already processing the first chunk, validating only for the 2nd and subsequent ones. The fix is to just move the check upwards so it's also validated for the 1st chunk. Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@xxxxxxxxxx> Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@xxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@xxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: moved code is slightly different] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -3426,6 +3426,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct n return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* Report violation if chunk len overflows */ + ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + WORD_ROUND(ntohs(ch->length)); + if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb)) + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, + commands); + /* Now that we know we at least have a chunk header, * do things that are type appropriate. */ @@ -3457,12 +3463,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct n } } - /* Report violation if chunk len overflows */ - ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + WORD_ROUND(ntohs(ch->length)); - if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb)) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); - ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end; } while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb));