4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> commit 74198eb4a42c4a3c4fbef08fa01a291a282f7c2e upstream. One of the factors that can result in the host concluding that a given guest in mounting a DOS attack is if the guest generates interrupts to the host when the host is not expecting it. If these "spurious" interrupts reach a certain rate, the host can throttle the guest to minimize the impact. The host computation of the "expected number of interrupts" is strictly based on the ring transitions. Until the host logic is fixed, base the guest logic to interrupt solely on the ring state. Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Rolf Neugebauer <rolf.neugebauer@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- drivers/hv/channel.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c | 2 -- drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c | 7 ------- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/hv/channel.c +++ b/drivers/hv/channel.c @@ -676,10 +676,18 @@ int vmbus_sendpacket_ctl(struct vmbus_ch * NOTE: in this case, the hvsock channel is an exception, because * it looks the host side's hvsock implementation has a throttling * mechanism which can hurt the performance otherwise. + * + * KYS: Oct. 30, 2016: + * It looks like Windows hosts have logic to deal with DOS attacks that + * can be triggered if it receives interrupts when it is not expecting + * the interrupt. The host expects interrupts only when the ring + * transitions from empty to non-empty (or full to non full on the guest + * to host ring). + * So, base the signaling decision solely on the ring state until the + * host logic is fixed. */ - if (((ret == 0) && kick_q && signal) || - (ret && !is_hvsock_channel(channel))) + if (((ret == 0) && signal)) vmbus_setevent(channel); return ret; @@ -786,9 +794,18 @@ int vmbus_sendpacket_pagebuffer_ctl(stru * If we cannot write to the ring-buffer; signal the host * even if we may not have written anything. This is a rare * enough condition that it should not matter. + * + * KYS: Oct. 30, 2016: + * It looks like Windows hosts have logic to deal with DOS attacks that + * can be triggered if it receives interrupts when it is not expecting + * the interrupt. The host expects interrupts only when the ring + * transitions from empty to non-empty (or full to non full on the guest + * to host ring). + * So, base the signaling decision solely on the ring state until the + * host logic is fixed. */ - if (((ret == 0) && kick_q && signal) || (ret)) + if (((ret == 0) && signal)) vmbus_setevent(channel); return ret; --- a/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c +++ b/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c @@ -449,8 +449,6 @@ static void vmbus_process_offer(struct v } dev_type = hv_get_dev_type(newchannel); - if (dev_type == HV_NIC) - set_channel_signal_state(newchannel, HV_SIGNAL_POLICY_EXPLICIT); init_vp_index(newchannel, dev_type); --- a/drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c +++ b/drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c @@ -75,13 +75,6 @@ static bool hv_need_to_signal(u32 old_wr if (READ_ONCE(rbi->ring_buffer->interrupt_mask)) return false; - /* - * When the client wants to control signaling, - * we only honour the host interrupt mask. - */ - if (policy == HV_SIGNAL_POLICY_EXPLICIT) - return true; - /* check interrupt_mask before read_index */ virt_rmb(); /* -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe stable" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html