The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 002ced4be6429918800ce3e41d5cbc2d7c01822c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2016 11:36:39 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] fscrypto: only allow setting encryption policy on directories
The FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl allowed setting an encryption
policy on nondirectory files. This was unintentional, and in the case
of nonempty regular files did not behave as expected because existing
data was not actually encrypted by the ioctl.
In the case of ext4, the user could also trigger filesystem errors in
->empty_dir(), e.g. due to mismatched "directory" checksums when the
kernel incorrectly tried to interpret a regular file as a directory.
This bug affected ext4 with kernels v4.8-rc1 or later and f2fs with
kernels v4.6 and later. It appears that older kernels only permitted
directories and that the check was accidentally lost during the
refactoring to share the file encryption code between ext4 and f2fs.
This patch restores the !S_ISDIR() check that was present in older
kernels.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@xxxxxxx>
diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c
index c9800b1a2e93..f96547f83cab 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/policy.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c
@@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ int fscrypt_process_policy(struct inode *inode,
return -EINVAL;
if (!inode_has_encryption_context(inode)) {
+ if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+ return -EINVAL;
if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir(inode))
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe stable" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html