On 7/7/16 7:20 PM, Tyler Hicks wrote: > On 07/05/2016 04:32 PM, jeffm@xxxxxxxx wrote: >> From: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@xxxxxxxx> >> >> There are legitimate reasons to disallow mmap on certain files, notably >> in sysfs or procfs. We shouldn't emulate mmap support on file systems >> that don't offer support natively. >> >> Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@xxxxxxxx> >> --- >> fs/ecryptfs/file.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- >> 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> >> diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/file.c b/fs/ecryptfs/file.c >> index 7000b96..4aaa656 100644 >> --- a/fs/ecryptfs/file.c >> +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/file.c >> @@ -169,6 +169,20 @@ out: >> return rc; >> } >> >> + >> +static int ecryptfs_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) >> +{ >> + struct dentry *dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(file_dentry(file)); > > This should be: > > struct file *lower_file = ecryptfs_file_to_lower(file); > >> + /* >> + * Don't allow mmap on top of file systems that don't support it >> + * natively. If FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH > 2 or ecryptfs >> + * allows recursive mounting, this will need to be extended. >> + */ >> + if (!d_inode(dentry)->i_fop->mmap) > > and then: > > if (!lower_file->f_op->mmap) > > > I'll make these simple changes, add stable to cc in the patch tags, and > push to Linus. Oh, whoops. Yeah, that's better. Thanks, -Jeff > Thanks again! > > Tyler > >> + return -ENODEV; >> + return generic_file_mmap(file, vma); >> +} >> + >> /** >> * ecryptfs_open >> * @inode: inode speciying file to open >> @@ -403,7 +417,7 @@ const struct file_operations ecryptfs_main_fops = { >> #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT >> .compat_ioctl = ecryptfs_compat_ioctl, >> #endif >> - .mmap = generic_file_mmap, >> + .mmap = ecryptfs_mmap, >> .open = ecryptfs_open, >> .flush = ecryptfs_flush, >> .release = ecryptfs_release, >> > > -- Jeff Mahoney SUSE Labs
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