3.6.11.6 stable review patch.
If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
[ Upstream commit 2810e5b9a7731ca5fce22bfbe12c96e16ac44b6f ]
This patch tries to coalesce tx requests when constructing grant copy
structures. It enables netback to deal with situation when frontend's
MAX_SKB_FRAGS is larger than backend's MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
With the help of coalescing, this patch tries to address two regressions
avoid reopening the security hole in XSA-39.
Regression 1. The reduction of the number of supported ring entries (slots)
per packet (from 18 to 17). This regression has been around for some time but
remains unnoticed until XSA-39 security fix. This is fixed by coalescing
slots.
Regression 2. The XSA-39 security fix turning "too many frags" errors from
just dropping the packet to a fatal error and disabling the VIF. This is fixed
by coalescing slots (handling 18 slots when backend's MAX_SKB_FRAGS is 17)
which rules out false positive (using 18 slots is legit) and dropping packets
using 19 to `max_skb_slots` slots.
To avoid reopening security hole in XSA-39, frontend sending packet using more
than max_skb_slots is considered malicious.
The behavior of netback for packet is thus:
1-18 slots: valid
19-max_skb_slots slots: drop and respond with an error
max_skb_slots+ slots: fatal error
max_skb_slots is configurable by admin, default value is 20.
Also change variable name from "frags" to "slots" in netbk_count_requests.
Please note that RX path still has dependency on MAX_SKB_FRAGS. This will be
fixed with separate patch.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 273 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
include/xen/interface/io/netif.h | 18 +++
2 files changed, 241 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
index 0ed1b26..d5a4e74 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
@@ -46,11 +46,25 @@
#include <asm/xen/hypercall.h>
#include <asm/xen/page.h>
+/*
+ * This is the maximum slots a skb can have. If a guest sends a skb
+ * which exceeds this limit it is considered malicious.
+ */
+#define MAX_SKB_SLOTS_DEFAULT 20
+static unsigned int max_skb_slots = MAX_SKB_SLOTS_DEFAULT;
+module_param(max_skb_slots, uint, 0444);
+
+typedef unsigned int pending_ring_idx_t;
+#define INVALID_PENDING_RING_IDX (~0U)
+
struct pending_tx_info {
- struct xen_netif_tx_request req;
+ struct xen_netif_tx_request req; /* coalesced tx request */
struct xenvif *vif;
+ pending_ring_idx_t head; /* head != INVALID_PENDING_RING_IDX
+ * if it is head of one or more tx
+ * reqs
+ */
};
-typedef unsigned int pending_ring_idx_t;
struct netbk_rx_meta {
int id;
@@ -101,7 +115,11 @@ struct xen_netbk {
atomic_t netfront_count;
struct pending_tx_info pending_tx_info[MAX_PENDING_REQS];
- struct gnttab_copy tx_copy_ops[MAX_PENDING_REQS];
+ /* Coalescing tx requests before copying makes number of grant
+ * copy ops greater or equal to number of slots required. In
+ * worst case a tx request consumes 2 gnttab_copy.
+ */
+ struct gnttab_copy tx_copy_ops[2*MAX_PENDING_REQS];
u16 pending_ring[MAX_PENDING_REQS];
@@ -117,6 +135,16 @@ struct xen_netbk {
static struct xen_netbk *xen_netbk;
static int xen_netbk_group_nr;
+/*
+ * If head != INVALID_PENDING_RING_IDX, it means this tx request is head of
+ * one or more merged tx requests, otherwise it is the continuation of
+ * previous tx request.
+ */
+static inline int pending_tx_is_head(struct xen_netbk *netbk, RING_IDX idx)
+{
+ return netbk->pending_tx_info[idx].head != INVALID_PENDING_RING_IDX;
+}
+
void xen_netbk_add_xenvif(struct xenvif *vif)
{
int i;
@@ -249,6 +277,7 @@ static int max_required_rx_slots(struct xenvif *vif)
{
int max = DIV_ROUND_UP(vif->dev->mtu, PAGE_SIZE);
+ /* XXX FIXME: RX path dependent on MAX_SKB_FRAGS */
if (vif->can_sg || vif->gso || vif->gso_prefix)
max += MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1; /* extra_info + frags */
@@ -626,6 +655,7 @@ static void xen_netbk_rx_action(struct xen_netbk *netbk)
__skb_queue_tail(&rxq, skb);
/* Filled the batch queue? */
+ /* XXX FIXME: RX path dependent on MAX_SKB_FRAGS */
if (count + MAX_SKB_FRAGS >= XEN_NETIF_RX_RING_SIZE)
break;
}
@@ -869,47 +899,78 @@ static void netbk_fatal_tx_err(struct xenvif *vif)
static int netbk_count_requests(struct xenvif *vif,
struct xen_netif_tx_request *first,
+ RING_IDX first_idx,
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp,
int work_to_do)
{
RING_IDX cons = vif->tx.req_cons;
- int frags = 0;
+ int slots = 0;
+ int drop_err = 0;
if (!(first->flags & XEN_NETTXF_more_data))
return 0;
do {
- if (frags >= work_to_do) {
- netdev_err(vif->dev, "Need more frags\n");
+ if (slots >= work_to_do) {
+ netdev_err(vif->dev,
+ "Asked for %d slots but exceeds this limit\n",
+ work_to_do);
netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif);
return -ENODATA;
}
- if (unlikely(frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS)) {
- netdev_err(vif->dev, "Too many frags\n");
+ /* This guest is really using too many slots and
+ * considered malicious.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(slots >= max_skb_slots)) {
+ netdev_err(vif->dev,
+ "Malicious frontend using %d slots, threshold %u\n",
+ slots, max_skb_slots);
netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif);
return -E2BIG;
}
- memcpy(txp, RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->tx, cons + frags),
+ /* Xen network protocol had implicit dependency on
+ * MAX_SKB_FRAGS. XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN is set to the
+ * historical MAX_SKB_FRAGS value 18 to honor the same
+ * behavior as before. Any packet using more than 18
+ * slots but less than max_skb_slots slots is dropped
+ */
+ if (!drop_err && slots >= XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN) {
+ if (net_ratelimit())
+ netdev_dbg(vif->dev,
+ "Too many slots (%d) exceeding limit (%d), dropping packet\n",
+ slots, XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN);
+ drop_err = -E2BIG;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(txp, RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->tx, cons + slots),
sizeof(*txp));
if (txp->size > first->size) {
- netdev_err(vif->dev, "Frag is bigger than frame.\n");
+ netdev_err(vif->dev,
+ "Invalid tx request, slot size %u > remaining size %u\n",
+ txp->size, first->size);
netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif);
return -EIO;
}
first->size -= txp->size;
- frags++;
+ slots++;
if (unlikely((txp->offset + txp->size) > PAGE_SIZE)) {
- netdev_err(vif->dev, "txp->offset: %x, size: %u\n",
+ netdev_err(vif->dev, "Cross page boundary, txp->offset: %x, size: %u\n",
txp->offset, txp->size);
netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif);
return -EINVAL;
}
} while ((txp++)->flags & XEN_NETTXF_more_data);
- return frags;
+
+ if (drop_err) {
+ netbk_tx_err(vif, first, first_idx + slots);
+ return drop_err;
+ }
+
+ return slots;
}
static struct page *xen_netbk_alloc_page(struct xen_netbk *netbk,
@@ -933,48 +994,114 @@ static struct gnttab_copy *xen_netbk_get_requests(struct xen_netbk *netbk,
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
skb_frag_t *frags = shinfo->frags;
u16 pending_idx = *((u16 *)skb->data);
- int i, start;
+ u16 head_idx = 0;
+ int slot, start;
+ struct page *page;
+ pending_ring_idx_t index, start_idx = 0;
+ uint16_t dst_offset;
+ unsigned int nr_slots;
+ struct pending_tx_info *first = NULL;
+
+ /* At this point shinfo->nr_frags is in fact the number of
+ * slots, which can be as large as XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN.
+ */
+ nr_slots = shinfo->nr_frags;
/* Skip first skb fragment if it is on same page as header fragment. */
start = (frag_get_pending_idx(&shinfo->frags[0]) == pending_idx);
- for (i = start; i < shinfo->nr_frags; i++, txp++) {
- struct page *page;
- pending_ring_idx_t index;
+ /* Coalesce tx requests, at this point the packet passed in
+ * should be <= 64K. Any packets larger than 64K have been
+ * handled in netbk_count_requests().
+ */
+ for (shinfo->nr_frags = slot = start; slot < nr_slots;
+ shinfo->nr_frags++) {
struct pending_tx_info *pending_tx_info =
netbk->pending_tx_info;
- index = pending_index(netbk->pending_cons++);
- pending_idx = netbk->pending_ring[index];
- page = xen_netbk_alloc_page(netbk, pending_idx);
+ page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_COLD);
if (!page)
goto err;
- gop->source.u.ref = txp->gref;
- gop->source.domid = vif->domid;
- gop->source.offset = txp->offset;
-
- gop->dest.u.gmfn = virt_to_mfn(page_address(page));
- gop->dest.domid = DOMID_SELF;
- gop->dest.offset = txp->offset;
-
- gop->len = txp->size;
- gop->flags = GNTCOPY_source_gref;
+ dst_offset = 0;
+ first = NULL;
+ while (dst_offset < PAGE_SIZE && slot < nr_slots) {
+ gop->flags = GNTCOPY_source_gref;
+
+ gop->source.u.ref = txp->gref;
+ gop->source.domid = vif->domid;
+ gop->source.offset = txp->offset;
+
+ gop->dest.domid = DOMID_SELF;
+
+ gop->dest.offset = dst_offset;
+ gop->dest.u.gmfn = virt_to_mfn(page_address(page));
+
+ if (dst_offset + txp->size > PAGE_SIZE) {
+ /* This page can only merge a portion
+ * of tx request. Do not increment any
+ * pointer / counter here. The txp
+ * will be dealt with in future
+ * rounds, eventually hitting the
+ * `else` branch.
+ */
+ gop->len = PAGE_SIZE - dst_offset;
+ txp->offset += gop->len;
+ txp->size -= gop->len;
+ dst_offset += gop->len; /* quit loop */
+ } else {
+ /* This tx request can be merged in the page */
+ gop->len = txp->size;
+ dst_offset += gop->len;
+
+ index = pending_index(netbk->pending_cons++);
+
+ pending_idx = netbk->pending_ring[index];
+
+ memcpy(&pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req, txp,
+ sizeof(*txp));
+ xenvif_get(vif);
+
+ pending_tx_info[pending_idx].vif = vif;
+
+ /* Poison these fields, corresponding
+ * fields for head tx req will be set
+ * to correct values after the loop.
+ */
+ netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx] = (void *)(~0UL);
+ pending_tx_info[pending_idx].head =
+ INVALID_PENDING_RING_IDX;
+
+ if (!first) {
+ first = &pending_tx_info[pending_idx];
+ start_idx = index;
+ head_idx = pending_idx;
+ }
+
+ txp++;
+ slot++;
+ }
- gop++;
+ gop++;
+ }
- memcpy(&pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req, txp, sizeof(*txp));
- xenvif_get(vif);
- pending_tx_info[pending_idx].vif = vif;
- frag_set_pending_idx(&frags[i], pending_idx);
+ first->req.offset = 0;
+ first->req.size = dst_offset;
+ first->head = start_idx;
+ set_page_ext(page, netbk, head_idx);
+ netbk->mmap_pages[head_idx] = page;
+ frag_set_pending_idx(&frags[shinfo->nr_frags], head_idx);
}
+ BUG_ON(shinfo->nr_frags > MAX_SKB_FRAGS);
+
return gop;
err:
/* Unwind, freeing all pages and sending error responses. */
- while (i-- > start) {
- xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, frag_get_pending_idx(&frags[i]),
- XEN_NETIF_RSP_ERROR);
+ while (shinfo->nr_frags-- > start) {
+ xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk,
+ frag_get_pending_idx(&frags[shinfo->nr_frags]),
+ XEN_NETIF_RSP_ERROR);
}
/* The head too, if necessary. */
if (start)
@@ -990,8 +1117,10 @@ static int xen_netbk_tx_check_gop(struct xen_netbk *netbk,
struct gnttab_copy *gop = *gopp;
u16 pending_idx = *((u16 *)skb->data);
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
+ struct pending_tx_info *tx_info;
int nr_frags = shinfo->nr_frags;
int i, err, start;
+ u16 peek; /* peek into next tx request */
/* Check status of header. */
err = gop->status;
@@ -1003,11 +1132,20 @@ static int xen_netbk_tx_check_gop(struct xen_netbk *netbk,
for (i = start; i < nr_frags; i++) {
int j, newerr;
+ pending_ring_idx_t head;
pending_idx = frag_get_pending_idx(&shinfo->frags[i]);
+ tx_info = &netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx];
+ head = tx_info->head;
/* Check error status: if okay then remember grant handle. */
- newerr = (++gop)->status;
+ do {
+ newerr = (++gop)->status;
+ if (newerr)
+ break;
+ peek = netbk->pending_ring[pending_index(++head)];
+ } while (!pending_tx_is_head(netbk, peek));
+
if (likely(!newerr)) {
/* Had a previous error? Invalidate this fragment. */
if (unlikely(err))
@@ -1232,11 +1370,12 @@ static unsigned xen_netbk_tx_build_gops(struct xen_netbk *netbk)
struct sk_buff *skb;
int ret;
- while (((nr_pending_reqs(netbk) + MAX_SKB_FRAGS) < MAX_PENDING_REQS) &&
+ while ((nr_pending_reqs(netbk) + XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN
+ < MAX_PENDING_REQS) &&
!list_empty(&netbk->net_schedule_list)) {
struct xenvif *vif;
struct xen_netif_tx_request txreq;
- struct xen_netif_tx_request txfrags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
+ struct xen_netif_tx_request txfrags[max_skb_slots];
struct page *page;
struct xen_netif_extra_info extras[XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_TYPE_MAX-1];
u16 pending_idx;
@@ -1297,7 +1436,8 @@ static unsigned xen_netbk_tx_build_gops(struct xen_netbk *netbk)
continue;
}
- ret = netbk_count_requests(vif, &txreq, txfrags, work_to_do);
+ ret = netbk_count_requests(vif, &txreq, idx,
+ txfrags, work_to_do);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
continue;
@@ -1324,7 +1464,7 @@ static unsigned xen_netbk_tx_build_gops(struct xen_netbk *netbk)
pending_idx = netbk->pending_ring[index];
data_len = (txreq.size > PKT_PROT_LEN &&
- ret < MAX_SKB_FRAGS) ?
+ ret < XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN) ?
PKT_PROT_LEN : txreq.size;
skb = alloc_skb(data_len + NET_SKB_PAD + NET_IP_ALIGN,
@@ -1374,6 +1514,7 @@ static unsigned xen_netbk_tx_build_gops(struct xen_netbk *netbk)
memcpy(&netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req,
&txreq, sizeof(txreq));
netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].vif = vif;
+ netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].head = index;
*((u16 *)skb->data) = pending_idx;
__skb_put(skb, data_len);
@@ -1504,7 +1645,10 @@ static void xen_netbk_idx_release(struct xen_netbk *netbk, u16 pending_idx,
{
struct xenvif *vif;
struct pending_tx_info *pending_tx_info;
- pending_ring_idx_t index;
+ pending_ring_idx_t head;
+ u16 peek; /* peek into next tx request */
+
+ BUG_ON(netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx] == (void *)(~0UL));
/* Already complete? */
if (netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx] == NULL)
@@ -1513,19 +1657,40 @@ static void xen_netbk_idx_release(struct xen_netbk *netbk, u16 pending_idx,
pending_tx_info = &netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx];
vif = pending_tx_info->vif;
+ head = pending_tx_info->head;
- make_tx_response(vif, &pending_tx_info->req, status);
+ BUG_ON(!pending_tx_is_head(netbk, head));
+ BUG_ON(netbk->pending_ring[pending_index(head)] != pending_idx);
- index = pending_index(netbk->pending_prod++);
- netbk->pending_ring[index] = pending_idx;
+ do {
+ pending_ring_idx_t index;
+ pending_ring_idx_t idx = pending_index(head);
+ u16 info_idx = netbk->pending_ring[idx];
- xenvif_put(vif);
+ pending_tx_info = &netbk->pending_tx_info[info_idx];
+ make_tx_response(vif, &pending_tx_info->req, status);
+
+ /* Setting any number other than
+ * INVALID_PENDING_RING_IDX indicates this slot is
+ * starting a new packet / ending a previous packet.
+ */
+ pending_tx_info->head = 0;
+
+ index = pending_index(netbk->pending_prod++);
+ netbk->pending_ring[index] = netbk->pending_ring[info_idx];
+
+ xenvif_put(vif);
+
+ peek = netbk->pending_ring[pending_index(++head)];
+
+ } while (!pending_tx_is_head(netbk, peek));
netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx]->mapping = 0;
put_page(netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx]);
netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx] = NULL;
}
+
static void make_tx_response(struct xenvif *vif,
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp,
s8 st)
@@ -1578,8 +1743,9 @@ static inline int rx_work_todo(struct xen_netbk *netbk)
static inline int tx_work_todo(struct xen_netbk *netbk)
{
- if (((nr_pending_reqs(netbk) + MAX_SKB_FRAGS) < MAX_PENDING_REQS) &&
- !list_empty(&netbk->net_schedule_list))
+ if ((nr_pending_reqs(netbk) + XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN
+ < MAX_PENDING_REQS) &&
+ !list_empty(&netbk->net_schedule_list))
return 1;
return 0;
@@ -1662,6 +1828,13 @@ static int __init netback_init(void)
if (!xen_domain())
return -ENODEV;
+ if (max_skb_slots < XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO
+ "xen-netback: max_skb_slots too small (%d), bump it to XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN (%d)\n",
+ max_skb_slots, XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN);
+ max_skb_slots = XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN;
+ }
+
xen_netbk_group_nr = num_online_cpus();
xen_netbk = vzalloc(sizeof(struct xen_netbk) * xen_netbk_group_nr);
if (!xen_netbk)
diff --git a/include/xen/interface/io/netif.h b/include/xen/interface/io/netif.h
index cb94668..a36c87a 100644
--- a/include/xen/interface/io/netif.h
+++ b/include/xen/interface/io/netif.h
@@ -13,6 +13,24 @@
#include "../grant_table.h"
/*
+ * Older implementation of Xen network frontend / backend has an
+ * implicit dependency on the MAX_SKB_FRAGS as the maximum number of
+ * ring slots a skb can use. Netfront / netback may not work as
+ * expected when frontend and backend have different MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
+ *
+ * A better approach is to add mechanism for netfront / netback to
+ * negotiate this value. However we cannot fix all possible
+ * frontends, so we need to define a value which states the minimum
+ * slots backend must support.
+ *
+ * The minimum value derives from older Linux kernel's MAX_SKB_FRAGS
+ * (18), which is proved to work with most frontends. Any new backend
+ * which doesn't negotiate with frontend should expect frontend to
+ * send a valid packet using slots up to this value.
+ */
+#define XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN 18
+
+/*
* Notifications after enqueuing any type of message should be conditional on
* the appropriate req_event or rsp_event field in the shared ring.
* If the client sends notification for rx requests then it should specify
--
1.7.10.4
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