This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
perf/core: Fix perf_event_open() vs. execve() race
to the 4.5-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
perf-core-fix-perf_event_open-vs.-execve-race.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.5 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
>From 79c9ce57eb2d5f1497546a3946b4ae21b6fdc438 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2016 11:36:53 +0200
Subject: perf/core: Fix perf_event_open() vs. execve() race
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
commit 79c9ce57eb2d5f1497546a3946b4ae21b6fdc438 upstream.
Jann reported that the ptrace_may_access() check in
find_lively_task_by_vpid() is racy against exec().
Specifically:
perf_event_open() execve()
ptrace_may_access()
commit_creds()
... if (get_dumpable() != SUID_DUMP_USER)
perf_event_exit_task();
perf_install_in_context()
would result in installing a counter across the creds boundary.
Fix this by wrapping lots of perf_event_open() in cred_guard_mutex.
This should be fine as perf_event_exit_task() is already called with
cred_guard_mutex held, so all perf locks already nest inside it.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: He Kuang <hekuang@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/events/core.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -1090,6 +1090,7 @@ static void put_ctx(struct perf_event_co
* function.
*
* Lock order:
+ * cred_guard_mutex
* task_struct::perf_event_mutex
* perf_event_context::mutex
* perf_event::child_mutex;
@@ -3415,7 +3416,6 @@ static struct task_struct *
find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid)
{
struct task_struct *task;
- int err;
rcu_read_lock();
if (!vpid)
@@ -3429,16 +3429,7 @@ find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid)
if (!task)
return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
- /* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. */
- err = -EACCES;
- if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
- goto errout;
-
return task;
-errout:
- put_task_struct(task);
- return ERR_PTR(err);
-
}
/*
@@ -8360,6 +8351,24 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
get_online_cpus();
+ if (task) {
+ err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ if (err)
+ goto err_cpus;
+
+ /*
+ * Reuse ptrace permission checks for now.
+ *
+ * We must hold cred_guard_mutex across this and any potential
+ * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
+ * serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the
+ * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
+ */
+ err = -EACCES;
+ if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
+ goto err_cred;
+ }
+
if (flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP)
cgroup_fd = pid;
@@ -8367,7 +8376,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
NULL, NULL, cgroup_fd);
if (IS_ERR(event)) {
err = PTR_ERR(event);
- goto err_cpus;
+ goto err_cred;
}
if (is_sampling_event(event)) {
@@ -8426,11 +8435,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
goto err_context;
}
- if (task) {
- put_task_struct(task);
- task = NULL;
- }
-
/*
* Look up the group leader (we will attach this event to it):
*/
@@ -8528,6 +8532,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
+ /*
+ * This is the point on no return; we cannot fail hereafter. This is
+ * where we start modifying current state.
+ */
+
if (move_group) {
/*
* See perf_event_ctx_lock() for comments on the details
@@ -8599,6 +8608,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
+ if (task) {
+ mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ put_task_struct(task);
+ }
+
put_online_cpus();
mutex_lock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
@@ -8631,6 +8645,9 @@ err_alloc:
*/
if (!event_file)
free_event(event);
+err_cred:
+ if (task)
+ mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
err_cpus:
put_online_cpus();
err_task:
@@ -8915,6 +8932,9 @@ static void perf_event_exit_task_context
/*
* When a child task exits, feed back event values to parent events.
+ *
+ * Can be called with cred_guard_mutex held when called from
+ * install_exec_creds().
*/
void perf_event_exit_task(struct task_struct *child)
{
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx are
queue-4.5/perf-x86-intel-pt-generate-pmi-in-the-stop-region-as-well.patch
queue-4.5/perf-core-fix-perf_event_open-vs.-execve-race.patch
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