From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> [ Upstream commit 79c9ce57eb2d5f1497546a3946b4ae21b6fdc438 ] Jann reported that the ptrace_may_access() check in find_lively_task_by_vpid() is racy against exec(). Specifically: perf_event_open() execve() ptrace_may_access() commit_creds() ... if (get_dumpable() != SUID_DUMP_USER) perf_event_exit_task(); perf_install_in_context() would result in installing a counter across the creds boundary. Fix this by wrapping lots of perf_event_open() in cred_guard_mutex. This should be fine as perf_event_exit_task() is already called with cred_guard_mutex held, so all perf locks already nest inside it. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: He Kuang <hekuang@xxxxxxxxxx> --- kernel/events/core.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 6da64f0..56d08dd 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -960,6 +960,7 @@ static void put_ctx(struct perf_event_context *ctx) * function. * * Lock order: + * cred_guard_mutex * task_struct::perf_event_mutex * perf_event_context::mutex * perf_event_context::lock @@ -3298,7 +3299,6 @@ static struct task_struct * find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid) { struct task_struct *task; - int err; rcu_read_lock(); if (!vpid) @@ -3312,16 +3312,7 @@ find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid) if (!task) return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); - /* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. */ - err = -EACCES; - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) - goto errout; - return task; -errout: - put_task_struct(task); - return ERR_PTR(err); - } /* @@ -7990,6 +7981,24 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, get_online_cpus(); + if (task) { + err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + if (err) + goto err_cpus; + + /* + * Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. + * + * We must hold cred_guard_mutex across this and any potential + * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to + * serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the + * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply). + */ + err = -EACCES; + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) + goto err_cred; + } + if (flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP) cgroup_fd = pid; @@ -7997,7 +8006,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, NULL, NULL, cgroup_fd); if (IS_ERR(event)) { err = PTR_ERR(event); - goto err_cpus; + goto err_cred; } if (is_sampling_event(event)) { @@ -8056,11 +8065,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, goto err_context; } - if (task) { - put_task_struct(task); - task = NULL; - } - /* * Look up the group leader (we will attach this event to it): */ @@ -8194,6 +8198,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, } mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); + if (task) { + mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + put_task_struct(task); + } + put_online_cpus(); event->owner = current; @@ -8228,6 +8237,9 @@ err_alloc: */ if (!event_file) free_event(event); +err_cred: + if (task) + mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); err_cpus: put_online_cpus(); err_task: @@ -8509,6 +8521,9 @@ static void perf_event_exit_task_context(struct task_struct *child, int ctxn) /* * When a child task exits, feed back event values to parent events. + * + * Can be called with cred_guard_mutex held when called from + * install_exec_creds(). */ void perf_event_exit_task(struct task_struct *child) { -- 1.8.5.2 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe stable" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html