From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@xxxxxxxxx> This patch has been added to the 4.1 stable tree. If you have any objections, please let us know. =============== [ Upstream commit 6736fde9672ff6717ac576e9bba2fd5f3dfec822 ] The code within wait_event_interruptible() is called with !TASK_RUNNING, so mustn't call any functions that can sleep, like mutex_lock(). Since we re-check the list_empty() in a loop after the wait, it's safe to simply use list_empty() without locking. This bug has existed forever, but was only discovered now because all userspace implementations, including the default 'rfkill' tool, use poll() or select() to get a readable fd before attempting to read. Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Fixes: c64fb01627e24 ("rfkill: create useful userspace interface") Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@xxxxxxxxxx> --- net/rfkill/core.c | 16 ++++------------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/rfkill/core.c b/net/rfkill/core.c index fa7cd79..a97bb73 100644 --- a/net/rfkill/core.c +++ b/net/rfkill/core.c @@ -1081,17 +1081,6 @@ static unsigned int rfkill_fop_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) return res; } -static bool rfkill_readable(struct rfkill_data *data) -{ - bool r; - - mutex_lock(&data->mtx); - r = !list_empty(&data->events); - mutex_unlock(&data->mtx); - - return r; -} - static ssize_t rfkill_fop_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos) { @@ -1108,8 +1097,11 @@ static ssize_t rfkill_fop_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, goto out; } mutex_unlock(&data->mtx); + /* since we re-check and it just compares pointers, + * using !list_empty() without locking isn't a problem + */ ret = wait_event_interruptible(data->read_wait, - rfkill_readable(data)); + !list_empty(&data->events)); mutex_lock(&data->mtx); if (ret) -- 2.5.0 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe stable" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html