[PATCH 3.12 010/123] client MUST ignore EncryptionKeyLength if CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY is set

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From: Noel Power <noel.power@xxxxxxxx>

3.12-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit f291095f340db986271e951e3891bb95624a93ea upstream.

[MS-SMB] 2.2.4.5.2.1 states:

"ChallengeLength (1 byte): When the CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY bit is set,
 the server MUST set this value to zero and clients MUST ignore this
 value."

Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@xxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
---
 fs/cifs/cifssmb.c | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c b/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
index 5f1f3285479e..ea938a8bf240 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
@@ -629,9 +629,8 @@ CIFSSMBNegotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses)
 		server->negflavor = CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_UNENCAP;
 		memcpy(ses->server->cryptkey, pSMBr->u.EncryptionKey,
 		       CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
-	} else if ((pSMBr->hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC ||
-			server->capabilities & CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY) &&
-				(pSMBr->EncryptionKeyLength == 0)) {
+	} else if (pSMBr->hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC ||
+			server->capabilities & CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY) {
 		server->negflavor = CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED;
 		rc = decode_ext_sec_blob(ses, pSMBr);
 	} else if (server->sec_mode & SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT) {
-- 
2.6.2

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