This is a note to let you know that I have just added a patch titled
net: fix incorrect credentials passing
to the linux-3.5.y-queue branch of the 3.5.y.z extended stable tree
which can be found at:
http://kernel.ubuntu.com/git?p=ubuntu/linux.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/linux-3.5.y-queue
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to this tree, please
reply to this email.
For more information about the 3.5.y.z tree, see
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Kernel/Dev/ExtendedStable
Thanks.
-Luis
------
>From 96dccef311064140d618805bb486db23019974e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2013 15:32:32 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] net: fix incorrect credentials passing
commit 83f1b4ba917db5dc5a061a44b3403ddb6e783494 upstream.
Commit 257b5358b32f ("scm: Capture the full credentials of the scm
sender") changed the credentials passing code to pass in the effective
uid/gid instead of the real uid/gid.
Obviously this doesn't matter most of the time (since normally they are
the same), but it results in differences for suid binaries when the wrong
uid/gid ends up being used.
This just undoes that (presumably unintentional) part of the commit.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[ luis: backport to 3.5 based on davem backport to 3.4 ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
include/linux/socket.h | 3 ++-
include/net/scm.h | 2 +-
net/core/sock.c | 14 ++++++++++----
3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/socket.h b/include/linux/socket.h
index 25d6322..2a32b9d 100644
--- a/include/linux/socket.h
+++ b/include/linux/socket.h
@@ -316,7 +316,8 @@ struct ucred {
/* IPX options */
#define IPX_TYPE 1
-extern void cred_to_ucred(struct pid *pid, const struct cred *cred, struct ucred *ucred);
+extern void cred_to_ucred(struct pid *pid, const struct cred *cred, struct ucred *ucred,
+ bool use_effective);
extern int memcpy_fromiovec(unsigned char *kdata, struct iovec *iov, int len);
extern int memcpy_fromiovecend(unsigned char *kdata, const struct iovec *iov,
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 0c0017c..9f211cf 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static __inline__ void scm_set_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm,
{
scm->pid = get_pid(pid);
scm->cred = cred ? get_cred(cred) : NULL;
- cred_to_ucred(pid, cred, &scm->creds);
+ cred_to_ucred(pid, cred, &scm->creds, false);
}
static __inline__ void scm_destroy_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm)
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index c5f765c..5d30122 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -807,15 +807,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sock_setsockopt);
void cred_to_ucred(struct pid *pid, const struct cred *cred,
- struct ucred *ucred)
+ struct ucred *ucred, bool use_effective)
{
ucred->pid = pid_vnr(pid);
ucred->uid = ucred->gid = -1;
if (cred) {
struct user_namespace *current_ns = current_user_ns();
- ucred->uid = from_kuid(current_ns, cred->euid);
- ucred->gid = from_kgid(current_ns, cred->egid);
+ if (use_effective) {
+ ucred->uid = from_kuid(current_ns, cred->euid);
+ ucred->gid = from_kgid(current_ns, cred->egid);
+ } else {
+ ucred->uid = from_kuid(current_ns, cred->uid);
+ ucred->gid = from_kgid(current_ns, cred->gid);
+ }
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cred_to_ucred);
@@ -976,7 +981,8 @@ int sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
struct ucred peercred;
if (len > sizeof(peercred))
len = sizeof(peercred);
- cred_to_ucred(sk->sk_peer_pid, sk->sk_peer_cred, &peercred);
+ cred_to_ucred(sk->sk_peer_pid, sk->sk_peer_cred,
+ &peercred, true);
if (copy_to_user(optval, &peercred, len))
return -EFAULT;
goto lenout;
--
1.8.1.2
--
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