3.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@xxxxxxxxxx>
[ Upstream commit ded34e0fe8fe8c2d595bfa30626654e4b87621e0 ]
As reported by Jan, and others over the past few years, there is a
race condition caused by unix_release setting the sock->sk pointer
to NULL before properly marking the socket as dead/orphaned. This
can cause a problem with the LSM hook security_unix_may_send() if
there is another socket attempting to write to this partially
released socket in between when sock->sk is set to NULL and it is
marked as dead/orphaned. This patch fixes this by only setting
sock->sk to NULL after the socket has been marked as dead; I also
take the opportunity to make unix_release_sock() a void function
as it only ever returned 0/success.
Dave, I think this one should go on the -stable pile.
Special thanks to Jan for coming up with a reproducer for this
problem.
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jan.stancek@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static void unix_sock_destructor(struct
#endif
}
-static int unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion)
+static void unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion)
{
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
struct dentry *dentry;
@@ -444,8 +444,6 @@ static int unix_release_sock(struct sock
if (unix_tot_inflight)
unix_gc(); /* Garbage collect fds */
-
- return 0;
}
static void init_peercred(struct sock *sk)
@@ -682,9 +680,10 @@ static int unix_release(struct socket *s
if (!sk)
return 0;
+ unix_release_sock(sk, 0);
sock->sk = NULL;
- return unix_release_sock(sk, 0);
+ return 0;
}
static int unix_autobind(struct socket *sock)
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe stable" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html