Patch "x86/sgx: Support loading enclave page without VMA permissions check" has been added to the 5.15-stable tree

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This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    x86/sgx: Support loading enclave page without VMA permissions check

to the 5.15-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     x86-sgx-support-loading-enclave-page-without-vma-per.patch
and it can be found in the queue-5.15 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.



commit 94468a5a1ecc904501ec4cec230fc9f453ba8d38
Author: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@xxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue May 10 11:08:41 2022 -0700

    x86/sgx: Support loading enclave page without VMA permissions check
    
    [ Upstream commit b3fb517dc6020fec85c82171a909da10c6a6f90a ]
    
    sgx_encl_load_page() is used to find and load an enclave page into
    enclave (EPC) memory, potentially loading it from the backing storage.
    Both usages of sgx_encl_load_page() are during an access to the
    enclave page from a VMA and thus the permissions of the VMA are
    considered before the enclave page is loaded.
    
    SGX2 functions operating on enclave pages belonging to an initialized
    enclave requiring the page to be in EPC. It is thus required to
    support loading enclave pages into the EPC independent from a VMA.
    
    Split the current sgx_encl_load_page() to support the two usages:
    A new call, sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(), behaves exactly like the
    current sgx_encl_load_page() that takes VMA permissions into account,
    while sgx_encl_load_page() just loads an enclave page into EPC.
    
    VMA, PTE, and EPCM permissions continue to dictate whether
    the pages can be accessed from within an enclave.
    
    Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@xxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d4393513c1f18987c14a490bcf133bfb71a5dc43.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@xxxxxxxxx
    Stable-dep-of: 0d3e0dfd68fb ("x86/sgx: Fix size overflows in sgx_encl_create()")
    Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
index fa5777af8da1a..70fd9aa47c68d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
@@ -232,25 +232,10 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
 	return epc_page;
 }
 
-static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
-						unsigned long addr,
-						unsigned long vm_flags)
+static struct sgx_encl_page *__sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+						  struct sgx_encl_page *entry)
 {
-	unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
 	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
-	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
-
-	entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr));
-	if (!entry)
-		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
-
-	/*
-	 * Verify that the faulted page has equal or higher build time
-	 * permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ,
-	 * VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags).
-	 */
-	if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits)
-		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
 
 	/* Entry successfully located. */
 	if (entry->epc_page) {
@@ -276,6 +261,40 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	return entry;
 }
 
+static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+						       unsigned long addr,
+						       unsigned long vm_flags)
+{
+	unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
+	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+
+	entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr));
+	if (!entry)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
+	/*
+	 * Verify that the page has equal or higher build time
+	 * permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ,
+	 * VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags).
+	 */
+	if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
+	return __sgx_encl_load_page(encl, entry);
+}
+
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+					 unsigned long addr)
+{
+	struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+
+	entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr));
+	if (!entry)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
+	return __sgx_encl_load_page(encl, entry);
+}
+
 static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 {
 	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
@@ -297,7 +316,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 
 	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-	entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags);
+	entry = sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags);
 	if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
 		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
 
@@ -445,7 +464,7 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_reserve_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
 	for ( ; ; ) {
 		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
 
-		entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vm_flags);
+		entry = sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(encl, addr, vm_flags);
 		if (PTR_ERR(entry) != -EBUSY)
 			break;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
index 332ef3568267e..a4894cf3f56a2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
@@ -119,5 +119,7 @@ unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
 void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page, unsigned int offset);
 bool sgx_va_page_full(struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
 void sgx_encl_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+					 unsigned long addr);
 
 #endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */




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