This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled rxrpc: Fix call state set to not include the SERVER_SECURING state to the 6.13-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is: rxrpc-fix-call-state-set-to-not-include-the-server_s.patch and it can be found in the queue-6.13 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it. commit ba376c92843d959659596363d492da08db76d362 Author: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Feb 4 23:05:53 2025 +0000 rxrpc: Fix call state set to not include the SERVER_SECURING state [ Upstream commit 41b996ce83bf944de5569d6263c8dbd5513e7ed0 ] The RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_SECURING state doesn't really belong with the other states in the call's state set as the other states govern the call's Rx/Tx phase transition and govern when packets can and can't be received or transmitted. The "Securing" state doesn't actually govern the reception of packets and would need to be split depending on whether or not we've received the last packet yet (to mirror RECV_REQUEST/ACK_REQUEST). The "Securing" state is more about whether or not we can start forwarding packets to the application as recvmsg will need to decode them and the decoding can't take place until the challenge/response exchange has completed. Fix this by removing the RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_SECURING state from the state set and, instead, using a flag, RXRPC_CALL_CONN_CHALLENGING, to track whether or not we can queue the call for reception by recvmsg() or notify the kernel app that data is ready. In the event that we've already received all the packets, the connection event handler will poke the app layer in the appropriate manner. Also there's a race whereby the app layer sees the last packet before rxrpc has managed to end the rx phase and change the state to one amenable to allowing a reply. Fix this by queuing the packet after calling rxrpc_end_rx_phase(). Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@xxxxxxxxxxxx> cc: Simon Horman <horms@xxxxxxxxxx> cc: linux-afs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250204230558.712536-2-dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx> diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h index d0fd37bdcfe9c..6b036c0564c7a 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h @@ -567,6 +567,7 @@ enum rxrpc_call_flag { RXRPC_CALL_EXCLUSIVE, /* The call uses a once-only connection */ RXRPC_CALL_RX_IS_IDLE, /* recvmsg() is idle - send an ACK */ RXRPC_CALL_RECVMSG_READ_ALL, /* recvmsg() read all of the received data */ + RXRPC_CALL_CONN_CHALLENGING, /* The connection is being challenged */ }; /* @@ -587,7 +588,6 @@ enum rxrpc_call_state { RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY, /* - client awaiting reply */ RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_RECV_REPLY, /* - client receiving reply phase */ RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_PREALLOC, /* - service preallocation */ - RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_SECURING, /* - server securing request connection */ RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST, /* - server receiving request */ RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_ACK_REQUEST, /* - server pending ACK of request */ RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_SEND_REPLY, /* - server sending reply */ diff --git a/net/rxrpc/call_object.c b/net/rxrpc/call_object.c index f9e983a12c149..e379a2a9375ae 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/call_object.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/call_object.c @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ const char *const rxrpc_call_states[NR__RXRPC_CALL_STATES] = { [RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY] = "ClAwtRpl", [RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_RECV_REPLY] = "ClRcvRpl", [RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_PREALLOC] = "SvPrealc", - [RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_SECURING] = "SvSecure", [RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST] = "SvRcvReq", [RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_ACK_REQUEST] = "SvAckReq", [RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_SEND_REPLY] = "SvSndRpl", @@ -453,17 +452,16 @@ void rxrpc_incoming_call(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, call->cong_tstamp = skb->tstamp; __set_bit(RXRPC_CALL_EXPOSED, &call->flags); - rxrpc_set_call_state(call, RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_SECURING); + rxrpc_set_call_state(call, RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST); spin_lock(&conn->state_lock); switch (conn->state) { case RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_UNSECURED: case RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING: - rxrpc_set_call_state(call, RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_SECURING); + __set_bit(RXRPC_CALL_CONN_CHALLENGING, &call->flags); break; case RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE: - rxrpc_set_call_state(call, RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST); break; case RXRPC_CONN_ABORTED: diff --git a/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c b/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c index ca5e694ab858b..c4eb7986efddf 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c @@ -222,10 +222,8 @@ static void rxrpc_abort_calls(struct rxrpc_connection *conn) */ static void rxrpc_call_is_secure(struct rxrpc_call *call) { - if (call && __rxrpc_call_state(call) == RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_SECURING) { - rxrpc_set_call_state(call, RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST); + if (call && __test_and_clear_bit(RXRPC_CALL_CONN_CHALLENGING, &call->flags)) rxrpc_notify_socket(call); - } } /* diff --git a/net/rxrpc/input.c b/net/rxrpc/input.c index 16d49a861dbb5..6a075a7c190db 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/input.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/input.c @@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ static bool rxrpc_input_split_jumbo(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb rxrpc_propose_delay_ACK(call, sp->hdr.serial, rxrpc_propose_ack_input_data); } - if (notify) { + if (notify && !test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_CONN_CHALLENGING, &call->flags)) { trace_rxrpc_notify_socket(call->debug_id, sp->hdr.serial); rxrpc_notify_socket(call); } diff --git a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c index 6abb8eec1b2b1..708a1484dadac 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c @@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ int rxrpc_do_sendmsg(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) } else { switch (rxrpc_call_state(call)) { case RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_CONN: - case RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_SECURING: + case RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST: if (p.command == RXRPC_CMD_SEND_ABORT) break; fallthrough;