This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
net: fix out-of-bounds access in ops_init
to the 5.10-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
net-fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-ops_init.patch
and it can be found in the queue-5.10 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
>From a26ff37e624d12e28077e5b24d2b264f62764ad6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 2 May 2024 10:20:06 -0300
Subject: net: fix out-of-bounds access in ops_init
From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@xxxxxxxxxx>
commit a26ff37e624d12e28077e5b24d2b264f62764ad6 upstream.
net_alloc_generic is called by net_alloc, which is called without any
locking. It reads max_gen_ptrs, which is changed under pernet_ops_rwsem. It
is read twice, first to allocate an array, then to set s.len, which is
later used to limit the bounds of the array access.
It is possible that the array is allocated and another thread is
registering a new pernet ops, increments max_gen_ptrs, which is then used
to set s.len with a larger than allocated length for the variable array.
Fix it by reading max_gen_ptrs only once in net_alloc_generic. If
max_gen_ptrs is later incremented, it will be caught in net_assign_generic.
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@xxxxxxxxxx>
Fixes: 073862ba5d24 ("netns: fix net_alloc_generic()")
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502132006.3430840-1-cascardo@xxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/core/net_namespace.c | 13 ++++++++++---
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/net/core/net_namespace.c
+++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c
@@ -86,12 +86,15 @@ u64 __net_gen_cookie(struct net *net)
static struct net_generic *net_alloc_generic(void)
{
+ unsigned int gen_ptrs = READ_ONCE(max_gen_ptrs);
+ unsigned int generic_size;
struct net_generic *ng;
- unsigned int generic_size = offsetof(struct net_generic, ptr[max_gen_ptrs]);
+
+ generic_size = offsetof(struct net_generic, ptr[gen_ptrs]);
ng = kzalloc(generic_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ng)
- ng->s.len = max_gen_ptrs;
+ ng->s.len = gen_ptrs;
return ng;
}
@@ -1241,7 +1244,11 @@ static int register_pernet_operations(st
if (error < 0)
return error;
*ops->id = error;
- max_gen_ptrs = max(max_gen_ptrs, *ops->id + 1);
+ /* This does not require READ_ONCE as writers already hold
+ * pernet_ops_rwsem. But WRITE_ONCE is needed to protect
+ * net_alloc_generic.
+ */
+ WRITE_ONCE(max_gen_ptrs, max(max_gen_ptrs, *ops->id + 1));
}
error = __register_pernet_operations(list, ops);
if (error) {
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from cascardo@xxxxxxxxxx are
queue-5.10/net-fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-ops_init.patch
