Patch "x86/bugs: Fix BHI retpoline check" has been added to the 5.15-stable tree

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This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    x86/bugs: Fix BHI retpoline check

to the 5.15-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     x86-bugs-fix-bhi-retpoline-check.patch
and it can be found in the queue-5.15 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.



commit 263f6744e99cd39b42e8a9bb36f2ff5ef6615b08
Author: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Fri Apr 12 11:10:33 2024 -0700

    x86/bugs: Fix BHI retpoline check
    
    [ Upstream commit 69129794d94c544810e68b2b4eaa7e44063f9bf2 ]
    
    Confusingly, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE doesn't mean retpolines are enabled,
    as it also includes the original "AMD retpoline" which isn't a retpoline
    at all.
    
    Also replace cpu_feature_enabled() with boot_cpu_has() because this is
    before alternatives are patched and cpu_feature_enabled()'s fallback
    path is slower than plain old boot_cpu_has().
    
    Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
    Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
    Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ad3807424a3953f0323c011a643405619f2a4927.1712944776.git.jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx
    Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b30b32b288dd4..247545b57dff6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1629,7 +1629,8 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)
 		return;
 
 	/* Retpoline mitigates against BHI unless the CPU has RRSBA behavior */
-	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)) {
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)) {
 		spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba();
 		if (rrsba_disabled)
 			return;
@@ -2783,11 +2784,13 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(void)
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_BHI))
 		return "; BHI: Not affected";
-	else if  (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW))
+	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW))
 		return "; BHI: BHI_DIS_S";
-	else if  (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP))
+	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP))
 		return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop";
-	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && rrsba_disabled)
+	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
+		 !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) &&
+		 rrsba_disabled)
 		return "; BHI: Retpoline";
 	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT))
 		return "; BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop";




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