This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: Protect against int overflow for stack access size
to the 5.10-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-protect-against-int-overflow-for-stack-access-si.patch
and it can be found in the queue-5.10 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
commit 3fead47bb090f6780106aa06bc68c4e6b99a3c4e
Author: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue Mar 26 22:42:45 2024 -0400
bpf: Protect against int overflow for stack access size
[ Upstream commit ecc6a2101840177e57c925c102d2d29f260d37c8 ]
This patch re-introduces protection against the size of access to stack
memory being negative; the access size can appear negative as a result
of overflowing its signed int representation. This should not actually
happen, as there are other protections along the way, but we should
protect against it anyway. One code path was missing such protections
(fixed in the previous patch in the series), causing out-of-bounds array
accesses in check_stack_range_initialized(). This patch causes the
verification of a program with such a non-sensical access size to fail.
This check used to exist in a more indirect way, but was inadvertendly
removed in a833a17aeac7.
Fixes: a833a17aeac7 ("bpf: Fix verification of indirect var-off stack access")
Reported-by: syzbot+33f4297b5f927648741a@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Reported-by: syzbot+aafd0513053a1cbf52ef@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQLORV5PT0iTAhRER+iLBTkByCYNBYyvBSgjN1T31K+gOw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@xxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327024245.318299-3-andreimatei1@xxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index fce2345f600f2..25f8a8716e88d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3941,6 +3941,11 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds(
err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type);
if (!err && max_off > 0)
err = -EINVAL; /* out of stack access into non-negative offsets */
+ if (!err && access_size < 0)
+ /* access_size should not be negative (or overflow an int); others checks
+ * along the way should have prevented such an access.
+ */
+ err = -EFAULT; /* invalid negative access size; integer overflow? */
if (err) {
if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
