Patch "bpf: Guard stack limits against 32bit overflow" has been added to the 6.7-stable tree

[Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>]

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    bpf: Guard stack limits against 32bit overflow

to the 6.7-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     bpf-guard-stack-limits-against-32bit-overflow.patch
and it can be found in the queue-6.7 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.



commit 5be67d9932c2ca93d7236b004f8c04306dcb7382
Author: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@xxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Dec 6 23:11:50 2023 -0500

    bpf: Guard stack limits against 32bit overflow
    
    [ Upstream commit 1d38a9ee81570c4bd61f557832dead4d6f816760 ]
    
    This patch promotes the arithmetic around checking stack bounds to be
    done in the 64-bit domain, instead of the current 32bit. The arithmetic
    implies adding together a 64-bit register with a int offset. The
    register was checked to be below 1<<29 when it was variable, but not
    when it was fixed. The offset either comes from an instruction (in which
    case it is 16 bit), from another register (in which case the caller
    checked it to be below 1<<29 [1]), or from the size of an argument to a
    kfunc (in which case it can be a u32 [2]). Between the register being
    inconsistently checked to be below 1<<29, and the offset being up to an
    u32, it appears that we were open to overflowing the `int`s which were
    currently used for arithmetic.
    
    [1] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/815fb87b753055df2d9e50f6cd80eb10235fe3e9/kernel/bpf/verifier.c#L7494-L7498
    [2] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/815fb87b753055df2d9e50f6cd80eb10235fe3e9/kernel/bpf/verifier.c#L11904
    
    Reported-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@xxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@xxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231207041150.229139-4-andreimatei1@xxxxxxxxx
    Stable-dep-of: 6b4a64bafd10 ("bpf: Fix accesses to uninit stack slots")
    Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index acc1f3b7b183..4d91df312b99 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -6761,7 +6761,7 @@ static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
  * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and
  * -state->allocated_stack for reads.
  */
-static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(int off,
+static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(s64 off,
 					  struct bpf_func_state *state,
 					  enum bpf_access_type t)
 {
@@ -6790,7 +6790,7 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds(
 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
-	int min_off, max_off;
+	s64 min_off, max_off;
 	int err;
 	char *err_extra;
 
@@ -6803,7 +6803,7 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds(
 		err_extra = " write to";
 
 	if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
-		min_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
+		min_off = (s64)reg->var_off.value + off;
 		max_off = min_off + access_size;
 	} else {
 		if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF ||