Patch "io_uring: annotate the struct io_kiocb slab for appropriate user copy" has been added to the 6.5-stable tree

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This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    io_uring: annotate the struct io_kiocb slab for appropriate user copy

to the 6.5-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     io_uring-annotate-the-struct-io_kiocb-slab-for-appro.patch
and it can be found in the queue-6.5 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.



commit 29f9b2894cfea72ed4c8c4b55307cae789094a8c
Author: Jens Axboe <axboe@xxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Aug 2 14:38:01 2023 -0600

    io_uring: annotate the struct io_kiocb slab for appropriate user copy
    
    [ Upstream commit b97f96e22f051d59d07a527dbd7d90408b661ca8 ]
    
    When compiling the kernel with clang and having HARDENED_USERCOPY
    enabled, the liburing openat2.t test case fails during request setup:
    
    usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to SLUB object 'io_kiocb' (offset 24, size 24)!
    ------------[ cut here ]------------
    kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
    invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
    CPU: 3 PID: 413 Comm: openat2.t Tainted: G                 N 6.4.3-g6995e2de6891-dirty #19
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.1-0-g3208b098f51a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
    RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
    Code: ce 49 89 ce 48 c7 c3 68 48 98 82 48 0f 44 de 48 c7 c7 56 c6 94 82 4c 89 de 48 89 c1 41 52 41 56 53 e8 e0 51 c5 00 48 83 c4 18 <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 41 57 41 56
    RSP: 0018:ffffc900016b3da0 EFLAGS: 00010296
    RAX: 0000000000000062 RBX: ffffffff82984868 RCX: 4e9b661ac6275b00
    RDX: ffff8881b90ec580 RSI: ffffffff82949a64 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
    RBP: 0000000000000018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: ffffc900016b3c88 R11: ffffc900016b3c30 R12: 00007ffe549659e0
    R13: ffff888119014000 R14: 0000000000000018 R15: 0000000000000018
    FS:  00007f862e3ca680(0000) GS:ffff8881b90c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 00005571483542a8 CR3: 0000000118c11000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
    Call Trace:
     <TASK>
     ? __die_body+0x63/0xb0
     ? die+0x9d/0xc0
     ? do_trap+0xa7/0x180
     ? usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
     ? do_error_trap+0xc6/0x110
     ? usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
     ? handle_invalid_op+0x2c/0x40
     ? usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
     ? exc_invalid_op+0x2f/0x40
     ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
     ? usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
     __check_heap_object+0xe2/0x110
     __check_object_size+0x142/0x3d0
     io_openat2_prep+0x68/0x140
     io_submit_sqes+0x28a/0x680
     __se_sys_io_uring_enter+0x120/0x580
     do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
    RIP: 0033:0x55714834de26
    Code: ca 01 0f b6 82 d0 00 00 00 8b ba cc 00 00 00 45 31 c0 31 d2 41 b9 08 00 00 00 83 e0 01 c1 e0 04 41 09 c2 b8 aa 01 00 00 0f 05 <c3> 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 89 30 eb 89 0f 1f 40 00 8b 00 a8 06
    RSP: 002b:00007ffe549659c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001aa
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe54965a50 RCX: 000055714834de26
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000003
    RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000008
    R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055714834f057
    R13: 00007ffe54965a50 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000557148351dd8
     </TASK>
    Modules linked in:
    ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
    
    when it tries to copy struct open_how from userspace into the per-command
    space in the io_kiocb. There's nothing wrong with the copy, but we're
    missing the appropriate annotations for allowing user copies to/from the
    io_kiocb slab.
    
    Allow copies in the per-command area, which is from the 'file' pointer to
    when 'opcode' starts. We do have existing user copies there, but they are
    not all annotated like the one that openat2_prep() uses,
    copy_struct_from_user(). But in practice opcodes should be allowed to
    copy data into their per-command area in the io_kiocb.
    
    Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@xxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>

diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
index 4e9217c1eb2e0..a1562f2cf3f3c 100644
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -4628,8 +4628,20 @@ static int __init io_uring_init(void)
 
 	io_uring_optable_init();
 
-	req_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(io_kiocb, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC |
-				SLAB_ACCOUNT | SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU);
+	/*
+	 * Allow user copy in the per-command field, which starts after the
+	 * file in io_kiocb and until the opcode field. The openat2 handling
+	 * requires copying in user memory into the io_kiocb object in that
+	 * range, and HARDENED_USERCOPY will complain if we haven't
+	 * correctly annotated this range.
+	 */
+	req_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("io_kiocb",
+				sizeof(struct io_kiocb), 0,
+				SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC |
+				SLAB_ACCOUNT | SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU,
+				offsetof(struct io_kiocb, cmd.data),
+				sizeof_field(struct io_kiocb, cmd.data), NULL);
+
 	return 0;
 };
 __initcall(io_uring_init);



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