This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/CPU/AMD: Fix the DIV(0) initial fix attempt
to the 6.1-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-cpu-amd-fix-the-div-0-initial-fix-attempt.patch
and it can be found in the queue-6.1 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
>From f58d6fbcb7c848b7f2469be339bc571f2e9d245b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2023 23:38:24 +0200
Subject: x86/CPU/AMD: Fix the DIV(0) initial fix attempt
From: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
commit f58d6fbcb7c848b7f2469be339bc571f2e9d245b upstream.
Initially, it was thought that doing an innocuous division in the #DE
handler would take care to prevent any leaking of old data from the
divider but by the time the fault is raised, the speculation has already
advanced too far and such data could already have been used by younger
operations.
Therefore, do the innocuous division on every exit to userspace so that
userspace doesn't see any potentially old data from integer divisions in
kernel space.
Do the same before VMRUN too, to protect host data from leaking into the
guest too.
Fixes: 77245f1c3c64 ("x86/CPU/AMD: Do not leak quotient data after a division by 0")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230811213824.10025-1-bp@xxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 2 --
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 ++
4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mod
static __always_inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode(void)
{
mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
+ amd_clear_divider();
}
#define arch_exit_to_user_mode arch_exit_to_user_mode
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -1295,3 +1295,4 @@ void noinstr amd_clear_divider(void)
asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "div %2\n\t", X86_BUG_DIV0)
:: "a" (0), "d" (0), "r" (1));
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(amd_clear_divider);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -206,8 +206,6 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY(exc_divide_error)
{
do_error_trap(regs, 0, "divide error", X86_TRAP_DE, SIGFPE,
FPE_INTDIV, error_get_trap_addr(regs));
-
- amd_clear_divider();
}
DEFINE_IDTENTRY(exc_overflow)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -3947,6 +3947,8 @@ static noinstr void svm_vcpu_enter_exit(
guest_state_enter_irqoff();
+ amd_clear_divider();
+
if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run(svm, spec_ctrl_intercepted);
else
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from bp@xxxxxxxxx are
queue-6.1/x86-cpu-fix-up-srso_safe_ret-and-__x86_return_thunk.patch
queue-6.1/x86-cpu-cleanup-the-untrain-mess.patch
queue-6.1/objtool-x86-fixup-frame-pointer-vs-rethunk.patch
queue-6.1/x86-srso-correct-the-mitigation-status-when-smt-is-disabled.patch
queue-6.1/x86-retpoline-don-t-clobber-rflags-during-srso_safe_ret.patch
queue-6.1/x86-retpoline-kprobes-fix-position-of-thunk-sections-with-config_lto_clang.patch
queue-6.1/x86-cpu-amd-fix-the-div-0-initial-fix-attempt.patch
queue-6.1/x86-cpu-rename-srso_-.-_alias-to-srso_alias_-1.patch
queue-6.1/x86-srso-explain-the-untraining-sequences-a-bit-more.patch
queue-6.1/x86-alternative-make-custom-return-thunk-unconditional.patch
queue-6.1/x86-cpu-rename-original-retbleed-methods.patch
queue-6.1/x86-cpu-clean-up-srso-return-thunk-mess.patch
queue-6.1/x86-srso-disable-the-mitigation-on-unaffected-configurations.patch
queue-6.1/x86-cpu-fix-__x86_return_thunk-symbol-type.patch
