This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
net/sched: act_ipt: add sanity checks on table name and hook locations
to the 5.15-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
net-sched-act_ipt-add-sanity-checks-on-table-name-an.patch
and it can be found in the queue-5.15 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
commit 2a3b47b329ea7be64065202a99b3223084d625d2
Author: Florian Westphal <fw@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue Jun 27 14:38:11 2023 +0200
net/sched: act_ipt: add sanity checks on table name and hook locations
[ Upstream commit b4ee93380b3c891fea996af8d1d3ca0e36ad31f0 ]
Looks like "tc" hard-codes "mangle" as the only supported table
name, but on kernel side there are no checks.
This is wrong. Not all xtables targets are safe to call from tc.
E.g. "nat" targets assume skb has a conntrack object assigned to it.
Normally those get called from netfilter nat core which consults the
nat table to obtain the address mapping.
"tc" userspace either sets PRE or POSTROUTING as hook number, but there
is no validation of this on kernel side, so update netlink policy to
reject bogus numbers. Some targets may assume skb_dst is set for
input/forward hooks, so prevent those from being used.
act_ipt uses the hook number in two places:
1. the state hook number, this is fine as-is
2. to set par.hook_mask
The latter is a bit mask, so update the assignment to make
xt_check_target() to the right thing.
Followup patch adds required checks for the skb/packet headers before
calling the targets evaluation function.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@xxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
diff --git a/net/sched/act_ipt.c b/net/sched/act_ipt.c
index 2f3d507c24a1f..ebd403f571ea5 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_ipt.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_ipt.c
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static int ipt_init_target(struct net *net, struct xt_entry_target *t,
par.entryinfo = &e;
par.target = target;
par.targinfo = t->data;
- par.hook_mask = hook;
+ par.hook_mask = 1 << hook;
par.family = NFPROTO_IPV4;
ret = xt_check_target(&par, t->u.target_size - sizeof(*t), 0, false);
@@ -87,7 +87,8 @@ static void tcf_ipt_release(struct tc_action *a)
static const struct nla_policy ipt_policy[TCA_IPT_MAX + 1] = {
[TCA_IPT_TABLE] = { .type = NLA_STRING, .len = IFNAMSIZ },
- [TCA_IPT_HOOK] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [TCA_IPT_HOOK] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING,
+ NF_INET_NUMHOOKS),
[TCA_IPT_INDEX] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[TCA_IPT_TARG] = { .len = sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) },
};
@@ -160,15 +161,27 @@ static int __tcf_ipt_init(struct net *net, unsigned int id, struct nlattr *nla,
return -EEXIST;
}
}
+
+ err = -EINVAL;
hook = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_IPT_HOOK]);
+ switch (hook) {
+ case NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING:
+ break;
+ case NF_INET_POST_ROUTING:
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto err1;
+ }
+
+ if (tb[TCA_IPT_TABLE]) {
+ /* mangle only for now */
+ if (nla_strcmp(tb[TCA_IPT_TABLE], "mangle"))
+ goto err1;
+ }
- err = -ENOMEM;
- tname = kmalloc(IFNAMSIZ, GFP_KERNEL);
+ tname = kstrdup("mangle", GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!tname))
goto err1;
- if (tb[TCA_IPT_TABLE] == NULL ||
- nla_strscpy(tname, tb[TCA_IPT_TABLE], IFNAMSIZ) >= IFNAMSIZ)
- strcpy(tname, "mangle");
t = kmemdup(td, td->u.target_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!t))
