Patch "af_key: Reject optional tunnel/BEET mode templates in outbound policies" has been added to the 6.1-stable tree

[Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>]

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    af_key: Reject optional tunnel/BEET mode templates in outbound policies

to the 6.1-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     af_key-reject-optional-tunnel-beet-mode-templates-in.patch
and it can be found in the queue-6.1 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.



commit e41cb78fc6a5b241c577f73fba7b5e9fa45c635a
Author: Tobias Brunner <tobias@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue May 9 11:00:06 2023 +0200

    af_key: Reject optional tunnel/BEET mode templates in outbound policies
    
    [ Upstream commit cf3128a7aca55b2eefb68281d44749c683bdc96f ]
    
    xfrm_state_find() uses `encap_family` of the current template with
    the passed local and remote addresses to find a matching state.
    If an optional tunnel or BEET mode template is skipped in a mixed-family
    scenario, there could be a mismatch causing an out-of-bounds read as
    the addresses were not replaced to match the family of the next template.
    
    While there are theoretical use cases for optional templates in outbound
    policies, the only practical one is to skip IPComp states in inbound
    policies if uncompressed packets are received that are handled by an
    implicitly created IPIP state instead.
    
    Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
    Signed-off-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@xxxxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>

diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c
index 95edcbedf6ef2..8c21de50eadf8 100644
--- a/net/key/af_key.c
+++ b/net/key/af_key.c
@@ -1940,7 +1940,8 @@ static u32 gen_reqid(struct net *net)
 }
 
 static int
-parse_ipsecrequest(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *rq)
+parse_ipsecrequest(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sadb_x_policy *pol,
+		   struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *rq)
 {
 	struct net *net = xp_net(xp);
 	struct xfrm_tmpl *t = xp->xfrm_vec + xp->xfrm_nr;
@@ -1958,9 +1959,12 @@ parse_ipsecrequest(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *rq)
 	if ((mode = pfkey_mode_to_xfrm(rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_mode)) < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	t->mode = mode;
-	if (rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_level == IPSEC_LEVEL_USE)
+	if (rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_level == IPSEC_LEVEL_USE) {
+		if ((mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL || mode == XFRM_MODE_BEET) &&
+		    pol->sadb_x_policy_dir == IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND)
+			return -EINVAL;
 		t->optional = 1;
-	else if (rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_level == IPSEC_LEVEL_UNIQUE) {
+	} else if (rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_level == IPSEC_LEVEL_UNIQUE) {
 		t->reqid = rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_reqid;
 		if (t->reqid > IPSEC_MANUAL_REQID_MAX)
 			t->reqid = 0;
@@ -2002,7 +2006,7 @@ parse_ipsecrequests(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sadb_x_policy *pol)
 		    rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len < sizeof(*rq))
 			return -EINVAL;
 
-		if ((err = parse_ipsecrequest(xp, rq)) < 0)
+		if ((err = parse_ipsecrequest(xp, pol, rq)) < 0)
 			return err;
 		len -= rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len;
 		rq = (void*)((u8*)rq + rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len);