This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: Do not reject when the stack read size is different from the tracked scalar size
to the 5.10-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
bpf-do-not-reject-when-the-stack-read-size-is-differ.patch
and it can be found in the queue-5.10 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
commit 00e90678b03c703b9def71623da6434afff4c50f
Author: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@xxxxxx>
Date: Mon Nov 1 23:45:35 2021 -0700
bpf: Do not reject when the stack read size is different from the tracked scalar size
[ Upstream commit f30d4968e9aee737e174fc97942af46cfb49b484 ]
Below is a simplified case from a report in bcc [0]:
r4 = 20
*(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r4
*(u32 *)(r10 -8) = r4 /* r4 state is tracked */
r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) /* Read more than the tracked 32bit scalar.
* verifier rejects as 'corrupted spill memory'.
*/
After commit 354e8f1970f8 ("bpf: Support <8-byte scalar spill and refill"),
the 8-byte aligned 32bit spill is also tracked by the verifier and the
register state is stored.
However, if 8 bytes are read from the stack instead of the tracked 4 byte
scalar, then verifier currently rejects the program as "corrupted spill
memory". This patch fixes this case by allowing it to read but marks the
register as unknown.
Also note that, if the prog is trying to corrupt/leak an earlier spilled
pointer by spilling another <8 bytes register on top, this has already
been rejected in the check_stack_write_fixed_off().
[0] https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/pull/3683
Fixes: 354e8f1970f8 ("bpf: Support <8-byte scalar spill and refill")
Reported-by: Hengqi Chen <hengqi.chen@xxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@xxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Tested-by: Hengqi Chen <hengqi.chen@xxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@xxxxxx>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211102064535.316018-1-kafai@xxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 0d0d7b140f05a..9e5f1ebe67d7f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2597,9 +2597,12 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
if (is_spilled_reg(®_state->stack[spi])) {
- if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
- u8 scalar_size = 0;
+ u8 spill_size = 1;
+
+ for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; i > 0 && stype[i - 1] == STACK_SPILL; i--)
+ spill_size++;
+ if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE || spill_size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; ");
verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n");
@@ -2610,10 +2613,7 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (dst_regno < 0)
return 0;
- for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE; i > 0 && stype[i - 1] == STACK_SPILL; i--)
- scalar_size++;
-
- if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == scalar_size) {
+ if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == spill_size) {
/* The earlier check_reg_arg() has decided the
* subreg_def for this insn. Save it first.
*/
@@ -2637,12 +2637,6 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
return 0;
}
- for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
- if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_SPILL) {
- verbose(env, "corrupted spill memory\n");
- return -EACCES;
- }
- }
if (dst_regno >= 0) {
/* restore register state from stack */
